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This dissertation seeks to understand (1) what are the differences in the coverage 
of climate change among ideologically different media agendas, (2) what effects do these 
differences in climate change coverage have on partisan publics, and (3) what attributes 
of climate change coverage have compelling arguments effects on public perception of 
the issue and the public’s willingness to engage in activism. The study comes up with 
three key findings. First, conservative media tend to adopt attributes that dismiss climate 
change and its effects as unreal, while liberal media are more likely to emphasize the 
reality of climate change. Second, this difference in media coverage influences the 
relationship between media attribute agenda and the perception of partisan publics. For 
example, media attributes that focus on the negative consequences of climate change 
exert consistent compelling arguments effects on the liberal public’s perception of the 
issue and intention to engage in climate change activism. However, higher frequencies of 
a number of climate change attributes in media coverage correlate with decreased 
 viii 
perceived importance of the issue among conservatives. Third, the public’s belief 
uncertainty moderates the effects of the media attribute agenda on the public’s perceived 
importance of climate change and intention to engage in action. 
This dissertation advances the compelling arguments concept in several ways. It is 
the first to provide empirical evidence on the relevance of this concept in examining the 
relationships between media attributes and behavioral intention. Also, its findings suggest 
that future agenda-setting research should take into account the fact that in today’s highly 
fragmented media environment, the news media agenda is becoming increasingly 
heterogeneous. The divergence in media coverage of a controversial issue is found to 
influence ideologically different public groups differently. Finally, individual 
predispositions should be considered in examining compelling agenda-setting effects on 
public perception and behaviors. Including differences in the news agenda as well as 
among the public will provide deeper insights into understanding the complexities of 
media effects on audiences. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
On June 24, 1988, Scientist James E. Hansen from NASA’s Goddard Institute for 
Space Studies told the Congress it was 99% certain that global warming had begun, and 
that it was caused by pollutants in the atmosphere (Leiserowitz, 2005). The testimony, 
which followed heat waves with record-high temperature, made headlines in major news 
media publications, bringing global warming to the agenda of policymakers as well as the 
public. The New York Times the next day printed: “Global warming has begun” 
(Shabecoff, 1988).  
It has been more than 25 years since that first congressional hearing, and global 
warming or climate change is still a controversial topic politically, economically and 
religiously (McCright & Dunlap, 2011). And in terms of media coverage of climate 
change, since the initial article in The New York Times, news coverage about this 
environmental phenomenon has been up and down. More than once, the news media, 
citing scientific findings, have warned of the earth being close to the tipping point, where 
actions need to be taken (Mooney, 2015). But the news media have also had reports 
claiming the whole climate change issue is a hoax, and that fear mongers were 
exacerbating the results of natural weather variations (The Washington Times, 2015). 
These views paint two different and contrasting pictures of climate change, showing deep 
partisanship.    
Public opinion has been divided on such aspects as whether global warming is 
happening or what has caused this environmental problem, among others. For example, 
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polling data show that in 2001, more than 60% of the American public believed the 
effects of climate change “have already begun,” and almost 55% attributed the increase in 
the earth’s temperature over the past century to “the effects of pollution from human 
activities.” In 2011, these figures were below 55% and 50% respectively (Marquart-Pyatt, 
Shwom, Dietz, Dunlap, Kaplowitz, McCright, & Zahran, 2011). These statistics attest to 
climate scientists’ concern that accurate public perception of climate change is far from 
enough to influence policymaking in adopting more effective measures to tackle this 
environmental issue.  
Scholars have argued that public opinion plays an important role in shaping 
government policies. For instance, Burstein (2003) found that heightened public opinion 
on numerous public affairs issues including social welfare, taxes, and the environment 
compelled the government to respond. Powlick and Katz (1998) also detected effects of 
public opinion on foreign policy. Regarding climate change, after Hansen’s testimony in 
1988, survey results showed 68% of the public had heard about greenhouse effects, a big 
jump from 38% in 1981. By the end of that year, 32 climate change-related bills had been 
introduced in the Congress (WorldWatch Institute, 2008). Thus, climate activists have 
always tried to find ways to influence public opinion to advocate for climate policies.  
Climate change scientists found that many factors could affect public opinion on 
climate change, fueling public skepticism about this environmental issue. Some of them 
include misinformation about the uncertainty among the scientific community, the 
technical aspects that prevent lay audiences from gaining a good understanding of the 
issue, and the government’s apathy towards this thorny problem (Lewandowsky, Gignac, 
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& Vaughan, 2013). The news media, with their role as the primary conduit through which 
the pubic receives information and learns about science, are also among those whom the 
scientific community blames (Nelkin, 1995; Wolf & Moser, 2011).  
Studies have examined the news media portrayal of climate change, exploring 
what frames journalists usually use in depicting this environmental problem (Antilla, 
2005; Carvalho, 2007; Dirikx & Gelders, 2010; Nisbet, 2009; Trumbo, 1996). But, often, 
they focused on portrayals at certain time points or ended at analyzing media content, 
making assumptions of climate change frames’ implied effects (Boykoff, 2008; Boykoff 
& Boykoff, 2004). Other papers sought to understand public awareness of, opinion about, 
and response to climate change (Kellstedt, Zahran, & Vedlitz, 2008; Leiserowitz, 2005; 
Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Reser, Bradley, Glendon, Ellul, & Callaghan, 2012).  
Empirical research has revealed evidence of the effects of media coverage of 
climate change on public attention to this environmental problem. For example, Brulle, 
Carmichael and Jenkins (2012) found an association between the attention of media to 
climate change and public awareness of it. Sampei and Aoyagi-Usi (2009)’s study of 
Japanese media discovered similar results with the public’s perception of the importance 
of climate change increasing when the volume of news on the issue rose. Arlt, Hoppe and 
Wolling (2011) found that media usage influenced audiences’ awareness of and 
behavioral intentions regarding climate change. These studies only focused on the 
amount of coverage of climate change and its association with public attention to the 
issue. However, climate change is a complex scientific issue. Public perception of it 
cannot be explained simply by heightened or declining attention, but involves accurate 
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knowledge of the issue. Identifying which aspects of climate change in the media 
portrayal of the issue are related to changes in public perception is expected to provide a 
more nuanced understanding of such a relationship.  
The advent of the Internet, and the rapidly evolving digital technologies have 
unleashed confusions and questions for the news industry. The abundance of news 
sources allows audiences to exercise their power in either selecting or avoiding the kind 
of information that they do or do not want to be exposed to (Napoli, 2011). This profound 
impact of digital technologies on mass media has led some scholars to conclude that the 
era of powerful effects may have passed. Bennett and Iyengar (2008, p. 708) posit that 
influence of the fragmented mass media on audiences has “become increasingly difficult 
to produce or measure in the aggregate.” Other scholars (Holbert, Garrett, & Gleason, 
2010) disagree with Bennett and Iyengar, arguing that the mainstream media still exert a 
full range of effects despite sociotechnical changes pervading the media system and 
democracy. While increasing empirical evidence has offered support to recently 
enlivened theoretical premises like selective exposure, other evidence from longitudinal 
studies shows no long-term decline in agenda-setting effects (Lee & Coleman, 2014; Tan 
& Weaver, 2013).  
Whether or not the fragmentation within the media industry itself as well as 
among the audience will eventually diminish the applicability of such pre-digital age 
media effects theories as agenda setting remains a question. It is important to note that 
technology is not the only factor that causes fragmentation within the mass media 
industry. Ideological and political differences have divided the media as well (Iyengar & 
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Hahn, 2009; Nie, Miller III, Golde, Butler, & Winneg, 2010). What is less clear is what 
effects, if any, that fragmentation has on audiences. Finding an answer to this question 
will provide valuable insights into the ongoing discussion on conceptual aspects of mass 
media effects research. In order to do that, this study focuses on how climate change, a 
controversial issue, is covered in partisan media and whether any differences in how it is 
portrayed influence public perception and behaviors with regard to this environmental 
phenomenon.    
Specifically, the purpose of this study is twofold. First, it investigates media 
attribute agenda-setting effects on public opinion and behaviors with regards to climate 
change. It examines such effects through a less common route: compelling arguments, 
which looks at the transfer of an object’s attribute salience on the media agenda to the 
public salience of that object (McCombs, 2014). So far only a limited amount of research 
has tested the compelling arguments hypothesis and most often the concept is applied to 
the study of politics. Thus, this dissertation contributes to the literature of agenda setting, 
and in particular, the compelling arguments theoretical concept, by assessing the salience 
of different aspects of climate change in the news media, stepping beyond commonly 
studied area of political issues. 
Traditionally, compelling arguments studies have looked at the relationship 
between media attribute salience and public issue salience. If an attribute of an object 
helps transfer the salience of that object from the media agenda to the public agenda, it is 
considered a compelling argument (Kiousis, 2005; McCombs, 2005, 2013). So far, only 
Kiousis (2005) has done a study on compelling arguments effects on public attitudes 
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towards presidential candidates. This is evidence that the concept is much broader 
theoretically than issue salience, focusing attention on the impact of individual attributes 
on subsequent outcomes among the public (McCombs, 2014; Ogawa, 2001; Stevenson, 
Böhme, & Nickel, 2001). This research expands the scope of the compelling arguments 
concept by investigating the effects of media attribute salience on behavioral (intention to 
engage in activism) outcomes among the public regarding a controversial public issue, 
climate change.  
Second, this dissertation draws on media polarization and selective exposure 
concepts, which assumes that people tend to seek likeminded news sources that match 
their personal beliefs and predispositions (Stroud, 2007). It explores the theoretical 
intersection between selective exposure and agenda setting. Specifically, it seeks to 
answer three important questions: (1) What are the differences on the climate change 
agendas in the media of different ideologies (2) What are the effects of those differences 
on public opinion and behavior regarding climate change? And (3) What audience factors 
moderate such effects? In so doing, this study contributes to a growing literature that 
provides empirical evidence on the interaction of these two major theoretical frameworks 
in mass communication, through examining the media coverage of climate change as 
well as its effects on different public groups (Chan & Lee, 2014; Muddiman, Stroud, & 
McCombs, 2014).  
 In addition, this research also aims at providing practical knowledge of climate 
change communication. After years of failing to keep the public informed about and 
engaged in climate change, scientists and policymakers have begun to realize that simply 
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communicating facts about this scientific phenomenon will not bring about success in 
altering the perceptions of either citizens or policymakers. There has been a dire need for 
a paradigm shift in how climate change should be communicated so that diverse 
audiences can connect with it. This study serves that practical purpose by providing 
empirical evidence on which attributes of climate change have a stronger influence on 
public perception of and behaviors regarding the issue. Thus, functionally it helps 
scientists and policymakers outline strategies to effectively communicate climate change 
to and engage intended audiences.  
This study relies on two methods. The first includes content analyzing articles and 
TV transcripts from major print news publications and broadcast channels including The 
New York Times, USA Today, MSNBC and Fox News. These data were used to identify 
the salience of climate change attributes in the news. The second method uses survey data 
provided by the Yale University Project on Climate Change Communication. The project 
has conducted nationally representative surveys on American public opinion on climate 
change since 2008. The use of secondary data from 2009 to 2014 allows for capturing 
changes longitudinally in relationships between media content and public views and 






CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, I will review the previous literature on the two main theoretical 
frameworks – compelling arguments and selective exposure – used in this study. I will 
discuss possible interactions between the two theories, which triggered the theoretical 
interests I had when starting this study. In addition, I will review the literature on public 
opinion on climate change as well as political polarization. 
Agenda Setting & Compelling Arguments 
Derived from Walter Lippmann’s (1922) argument about the media’s ability to construct 
social realities in the public mind, agenda setting refers to the transfer of the salience of 
elements in the news media to the public agenda. In the seminal Chapel Hill study, 
McCombs and Shaw (1972) surveyed voters on the issues they were most concerned 
about and compared the results with analyses of media content in nine news media used 
by local voters. The researchers found the issues that voters thought most important 
correlated strongly with what was emphasized in the news. In other words, the media’s 
attention to a key public issue can influence the public’s assessment of importance 
regarding that issue. Based on the findings, the researchers argued that the media have the 
ability to transfer the salience of news content to the audience, thus, succeeding in telling 
us what to think about. Since then, this first-level agenda-setting effect has been 
replicated hundreds of times by researchers around the world (McCombs, 2004).   
But an individual object – issue, public figure, or other object of attention – may 
have numerous attributes. These attributes are characteristics and properties of that object 
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(McCombs, 2004), defining how the object is seen. Among the many public issues at any 
point in time, some are made salient by the media. Some are not. The same thing happens 
to attributes of an object. For example, terrorism is an issue that drew extensive media 
and public attention after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. In examining the 
media coverage of terrorism, Craft and Wanta (2004) found that some of the attributes of 
the issue were more salient in the news. Those included length of the war against 
terrorism, future terrorist attack, effects on economy and Israel – Palestine conflict. 
Others such as biological threats, air travel safety, war protests or Afghan civilian deaths 
did not receive much attention. Of those the scholars found significant agenda-setting 
effects from the media content on the public’s perception of the importance of several 
aspects of the issue including future terrorist attack, effects on economy, Israel – 
Palestine conflict, and war protests. The findings corroborated the arguments about 
attribute or second level effects of the media on public opinion. These effects, according 
to McCombs (2014) are evidence of a thesis that the media can also tell us how to think 
about an object.  
The expansion of the theory into the second level, which became solidified in the 
1990s, has brought a new theoretical perspective in studying agenda-setting effects 
(McCombs, 2005; McCombs & Shaw, 1993). First level agenda setting looks at the 
effects of the sheer volume of exposure to media content. The second-level, however, 
examines the effects of specific mass media content, hence providing a more detailed 
understanding of agenda setting (McCombs, 2014). 
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A substantial amount of research has utilized second level agenda setting to 
identify the influence of the news media on candidates’ perceived attributes in elections. 
For example, McCombs, Lopez-Escobar and Llamas (2000) found strong correlations 
between the media and the public agendas on the attributes of the major party candidates 
in Spain’s 1996 general election with a median coefficient of +0.72. Results from other 
studies have also corroborated these second level effects in researching controversial 
issues. Kim, Han, Choi and Kim (2012), for instance, detected statistically significant 
relationships between the salience of certain attributes of the controversy regarding the 
South Korean government’s plan to relocate the country’s administrative capital in 
television news and people’s perception of that plan. Incorporating the priming concept, 
these scholars found that the news media’s emphasis on three (i.e. Balanced development 
across the nation; Solution to metropolitan problems, and; Tremendous relocation cost) 
out of five attributes of the issue was also associated with the standards the respondents 
used to evaluate that plan. In short, these findings demonstrate the relevance of the 
attribute agenda-setting theoretical perspective to explicating the link between media 
portrayal of and public opinion regarding such a controversial issue as climate change.   
Second-level agenda setting refers to both the substantive and affective 
dimensions of attributes. Substantive attributes are those characteristics of an object that 
we rely on when we cognitively discern it. For example, Lee (2010) selected five 
attributes that were frequently mentioned when news media report on climate change. 
Those included ecosystem, flood, industrial business, energy policy and regional conflict. 
In his experiment, Lee found a strong correspondence between the respondents’ 
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assessment of attributes of global warming and the salience of these attributes in the texts 
participants read.  
Affective attributes are the facets of news coverage that provoke emotions. In 
general, the agenda-setting effects of an attribute might be influenced by how that 
attribute is presented in the news. In other words, whether that attribute is portrayed as 
positive or negative can affect the audience’s perception of it. Wanta, Golan, and Lee 
(2004) found salient affective attributes of a country in the news have effects on how the 
public perceives that foreign nation. This study is primarily concerned with substantive 
attributes of climate change rather than affective. 
Attribute agenda setting does not only focus on the transfer of attribute salience 
from one agenda to another. This theoretical perspective includes two different types of 
effects. The first type is about the relationship between object attributes on two agendas. 
For example, the news emphasizes natural disaster, an attribute of climate change, which 
the public also ranks high in their assessment of its importance among other climate 
change attributes (e.g. energy issue, economic issues, etc.). So, the transfer of salience is 
direct from media attribute agenda to public attribute agenda. The second type of effect 
identifies the link between object attribute salience in the media agenda and the salience 
of that object in the public agenda (Ghanem, 1997). For instance, of all the attributes of 
climate change mentioned in the news, the salience of natural disaster corresponds 
strongly with the public’s perceived importance of climate change issue object. So, the 
effects cross over from the second to the first level. The latter is conceptualized as 
“compelling arguments,” which will be used as the major theoretical base in this study. 
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Second-level agenda-setting research can focus on two types of public salience as 
dependent variables – object salience and attribute salience. The media’s emphasis on 
certain attributes, which belong to an object, could contribute to the salience of those 
attributes in the public agenda. But, those emphasized attributes could also make the 
object itself become more prominent in the public agenda. McCombs (2014, p. 51) posits 
that the conceptualization of the second level was metaphorically based on the inhabitants 
of George Orwell’s fictional Animal Farm: 
Some attributes are more equal than other attributes. Some are more likely than 
others to be regularly included in media messages, and some are more likely than 
others to be noticed and remembered. In the interpretation of a message some 
attributes will also be considered more pertinent than others. Certain 
characteristics of an object may resonate with the public in such a way that they 
become especially compelling arguments for the salience of the issue, person, or 
topic. 
Extant research has found extensive evidence of compelling arguments. In the 
very first study that investigated compelling arguments effects, Ghanem (1997) 
discovered that during the early 1990s the news media in the state of Texas had extensive 
coverage of crimes. Such attention significantly correlated with public’s concerns that 
crime is the most important issue the country faced. In reality, the actual crime rate in 
Texas was declining. Of the crime attributes mentioned in the media, two (e.g. average 
people would feel threatened about a crime (+0.78); and where crimes may actually 
happen in Texas (+0.73) saw statistically significant degrees of correspondence with the 
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concerns of the public about crimes. Ghanem suggested that the salience of these two 
attributes had influenced public’s assessment of the importance of the crime issue, 
showing a compelling arguments effects. In a more recent study, Saldana, Ardevol-
Abreu, Guo, and McCombs (2014) found that seven out of eight attributes individually 
prominent in the news media were compelling arguments for the issue of the war on 
drugs.  
The compelling arguments hypothesis has been tested in other countries as well. 
Takeshita and Mikami’s (1995) study is an example. In researching the agenda-setting 
effects of the news media on the public in Japan’s 1993 local election, the two 
researchers discovered significant associations between the news media and voters’ 
agendas for the issue of political reform. Two attributes of that issue, ethics and system 
restructure were identified. However, only the later revealed a statistically significant 
relationship between the two agendas. In this case, system restructure is considered a 
compelling argument.  
Theoretically, it has been argued that the compelling arguments hypothesis has 
further extended agenda setting by integrating this theoretical approach with framing. In 
Ghanem’s (1997) study, two frames of crimes (e.g. average people would feel threatened 
about a crime; and where crimes may actually happen in Texas) that were emphasized in 
the media corresponded with the public’s perception of crime as the most important 
problem. Thus, “compelling arguments are frames” which function as ways to organize 
and restructure the picture of an object in the mind of the public (McCombs, 2014, p. 92). 
The concept captures a psychological aspect of the process in which agenda-setting 
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effects occur. That is, human minds tend to selectively record only a limited number of 
aspects of an object simply because they cannot pay attention to everything. But these 
few aspects help make the object accessible in audiences’ memories. Whether the 
attribute images stored in people’s minds would lead to further consequences including 
opinion formation and/or eventually actions require deeper examination. This research 
takes on that task to investigate the compelling arguments effects of climate 
change/global warming attributes on the public perception of and behavior with regards 
to this environmental issue.  
Agenda Setting, Public Opinion and Behavior  
In addition to exploring the perceived importance of issues/objects, a substantial body of 
research has scrutinized further consequences of agenda setting, linking it with other 
theoretical concepts to explicate its effects. One of those is priming, which refers to "the 
process in which the media attend to some issues and not others and thereby alter the 
standards by which people evaluate” objects or issues in the real world (Severin & 
Tankard, 2001, p. 226).  
The two theoretical frameworks share several common aspects. First, both are 
concerned with the audience’s selective attention to media content. Second, they both 
rely on salience and accessibility as dependent variables (Willnat, 1997). But while 
agenda setting centers on salience transfer, priming focuses on the evaluation of objects 
(i.e. opinion direction) and behavioral consequences (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Scheufele, 
2000). Perhaps, because of these conceptual similarities, some scholars see priming as an 
extension of agenda setting (Comstock & Scharrer, 1999; McCombs, 2014). Others, 
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however, consider agenda setting as a variant of priming (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). 
Albeit disagreements, the combination of the two approaches presents a stronger 
theoretical basis for studies looking at the cognitive effects of media attention on 
audiences (Willnat, 1997).  
According to McCombs (2014), although the starting point for research on 
compelling arguments was the relationship between media attribute salience and public 
issue salience, the concept is much broader theoretically, focusing attention on the impact 
of individual attributes on subsequent outcomes among the public. Issue salience is only 
one of these outcomes. However, to date most compelling arguments studies have 
examined only the association between attribute and issue salience (McCombs, 2014). 
Extending the compelling arguments approach, this study integrates the effects of 
attributes of climate change with the established effects of issue salience and attribute 
salience on public opinion and behavioral change. With the addition of the ‘compelling 
arguments’ link to Box 6.1 in Setting the Agenda, we see the relationship of media object 
salience to public opinion and action engagement as well as the relationship of media 
attribute salience to public opinion. In other words, this study will theoretically integrate 
and expand the concept of compelling arguments to behaviors. Whether calling its 
theoretical framework the combination of compelling arguments and priming or an 
extension of the scope of compelling arguments empirically, its findings are expected to 
provide deeper understanding of the effects of media climate change attributes on public 
opinion and behaviors.  
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Figure 1: Compelling arguments effects on public object salience, opinion formation 
and behavior.   
 
Climate Change in the News 
Although it is predicted that the effects of climate change will be widespread and serious, 
the amount of the U.S. news media coverage of this transnational phenomenon has 
fluctuated. For example, discourse on climate change remained sparse until the summer 
of 1988, when the U.S. experienced high temperatures and a severe drought, a period 
which is also termed “the weather scare” (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Carvalho & 
Burgess, 2005). Other scholars added another reason for this surging trend of coverage of 
climate change. That is the 1988 testimony to the American congress of NASA scientist 
James Hansen, who vehemently said that he was 99% sure that the cause of rising 
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temperature was not because of weather variations, and that burning fossil fuel is the 
culprit (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Boykoff & Roberts, 2007). 
The news coverage of climate change dropped between 1991 and 1996, when the 
first Iraq War and economic downturn drove media attention away from this 
environmental topic (Anderson, 2009). Debates on the issue in the news rose in 1997 as 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted the Kyoto 
Protocol, which called for industrialized countries’ to commit to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions (Boykoff & Roberts, 2007; Leggett, 2001). After that the amount of climate 
change coverage subsided again. The 2000s saw a gradual increase in news coverage of 
climate change. In 2006, the release of Al Gore’s documentary An Inconvenient Truth, 
helped draw the issue back into the media spotlight (Anderson, 2009).  
Climategate, which broke out in the latter half of 2009, had profound impacts on 
public opinion in subsequent months. The incident involved the revelation of a series of 
email exchanges, in which climate scientists from two institutions, one in the U.S. and the 
other in the UK, described the use of a “trick” to hide the declining trend of temperatures. 
It drew considerable media attention, and quickly became parts of climate skeptics’ 
rhetoric to deny climate change, claiming it a hoax. 
What is more serious is that the incident hurt the public’s support for efforts to 
push for policymaking with regards to climate change mitigation and prevention. For 
example, Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith and Dawson (2013) found 
significant declines of belief in climate change, risk perception, and trust in scientists 
among the American public between the year before (2008) and the year after (2010) that 
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climategate happened. The loss of trust, according to the results, was significantly higher 
among politically conservative individuals. Hmielowski, Feldman, Myers, Leiserowitz 
and Maibach (2013) discovered that conservative media use decreases trust in scientists, 
and also in certainty of the existence of climate change. As argued earlier, from a media 
psychology perspective not all media attributes of an issue have equally significant 
effects on public opinion or behaviors. Thus, a question remains about which aspects of 
climate change in the media influence the public. 
Past research has identified various attributes and frames of climate change. 
Based on a careful review of the literature, this research uses attributes derived from Liu, 
Lindquist and Vedlitz (2011)’s study, which content analyzed newspaper articles on 
climate change from 1992 to 2005. These attributes are divided into four groups, 
including Issue Image (e.g. bad effects and good/no effects); Issue Remedy (e.g. 
Solution/action and no solution/action); Issue Existence (e.g. existence and no existence); 
Issue Linkages (e.g. energy – no link to energy, economy – no link to economy, society – 
no link to society). 
1. Issue image (effects) is “the fundamental impression of an issue and has a 
powerful influence on shaping public understanding and policy agendas” (Liu et al., 
2011, p. 383). One of the critical aspects of climate change that has dominated 
discussions among the public, policy makers and scientists is what effects climate change 
would have (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Weber, 2006). Effects of climate change may 
be either positive of negative. Negative effects include rising seawater, melting polar ice, 
increasing temperatures, more frequent natural disasters, extinction of species, and health 
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problems among others. As a complex scientific phenomenon, a common perception of 
climate change among the mass public is that it is a psychologically distant issue that 
would not be personally threatening to them (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Spence & 
Pidgeon, 2010). Hence, highlighting the impacts of climate change and situating it in 
local contexts would make it more pertinent to the public (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). 
In addition, a common journalistic practice is to encourage dramatization of events, 
emphasizing their sensational aspects while eschewing comprehensive analyses regarding 
these problems in order to give problems the energy to be sustained on the news agenda 
(Bennett, 1996; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007; Wilkins & Patterson, 1987). Scholars have 
pointed out that the news media have increasingly portrayed climate change as a threat, 
focusing on the severe effects that may come as the consequences of it (Hart & Feldman, 
2014). However, climate change has also been presented as posing either no harm or 
having good effects as well (Liu et al., 2011). This is especially logical because some 
media have been found to hold partisan views (Feldman, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & 
Leiserowitz, 2012; Hart, 2008). In this study, effects are assessed as two separate 
attributes including bad effects and good/no effects.  
2. Issues Remedy (Solution/Actions): When portraying an issue problem, the 
news tends to also propose treatments to that problem (Entman, 1993). With regards to 
climate change, some news content has focused on reporting on solutions and actions that 
would help mitigate the impacts of it, encouraging good practices that enhance social 
progress (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009). On the other hand, one of the arguments that 
deniers of climate change usually use and often get adopted by the media, claims that no 
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solutions/actions are necessary to tame or mitigate its effects for it is not a real 
phenomenon. Also, some argue that taking actions to fight climate change would bring 
about possible reverse consequences such as hurting the economy or businesses (Elsasser 
& Dunlap, 2012).  
3. Issue Existence: The controversy of whether or not climate change exists or is 
manmade has been pervasive in the media discourse (Feldman et al., 2012). While 
growing scientific evidence on the existence of climate change has been reflected in the 
media, the politicization of, and increasing elite and media polarization with regards to 
the issue, have also kept skeptic voices part of discussions as well (Boykoff, 2013). For 
example, dismissive language has been found to be more apparent in Fox News’ content 
compared to CNN and MSNBC (Feldman et al., 2012). 
4. Issue Linkages: Climate change impacts are predicted to be widespread, 
influencing broad socio-economic issues (Nisbet, 2009). As such, it has often been 
portrayed together with such issues as energy, economics and broad social concerns. 
Making these links salient or downplaying them in media content may influence public 
perception of climate change. 
Using the aforementioned attributes, this study asks: 
RQ1: Which attributes of climate change are salient in the news?  
At its core, the agenda-setting concept is fundamentally based on the assumption 
that the news media agenda is homogeneous, which provides members of the audience 
with similar news experiences (McCombs, 2014). However, recent changes in the media 
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industry have fueled an argument that the media has been increasingly fragmented. For 
example, Iyengar and Hahn (2009) contended that several decades ago, before the advent 
of cable TV and subsequently the Internet, the majority of the American public got their 
news from one of big three network TV stations. Newscasts offered by these TV channels 
as well as reports from daily newspapers provided similar and generic perspectives on the 
news. But the widening political partisanship has split the U.S. media into two distinct 
turfs of “red” and “blue” or conservative and liberal. In this same line of thought, other 
scholars argued that as the fragmentation in the news industry and the public accelerated 
a homogeneous news agenda may no longer exist (Sustain, 2008; Bennett & Iyengar, 
2008), thus leading to the demise of agenda setting.  
Some media researchers, on the other hand, contended that despite partisanship 
and diverse media choices made possible by digital technologies, the homogeneity of the 
news media agenda remains unchanged (Yu, 2005), hence members of public still share 
similar news experiences (Lee, 2009). Most studies in this area, however, have 
investigated changes in the media agenda using a broad array of public issues, with many 
of them still receiving consensus among news outlets and the public. This research, for 
the most part, suggests that the diversity of the news media agenda does exist, but 
perhaps only at the attribute level, especially if we examine news content on an 
individual issue that is highly controversial. To provide empirical evidence for this, this 
dissertation examines the differences in the attribute agenda of climate change among 
ideological media. It predicts that: 
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H1a: Conservative media will be more likely to emphasize dismissive 
climate change attributes than liberal and middle ground media.   
H1b: Liberal media will be more likely to emphasize accepting climate 
change attributes than conservative and middle ground media. 
Public Opinion on Climate Change 
Although scholars believe that climate change has a wide range of local, national, and 
international effects (Nisbet & Myers, 2007), poll results demonstrated that American 
public has increasingly been aware of global climate change. In 2001, 12 years after 
Hansen testified in the congress about the existence of global warming, 82% of the 
American public had heard or read about global warming (PIPA, 2003, cited in 
Leiserowit, 2005). However, public opinion on this issue has shown fluctuations over 
past decades.  
According to Gallup poll results, in 1989, 48% of the American public believed 
the effects of this environmental phenomenon were already happening. This figure rose 
to its peak in 2008, when Al Gore released his well-known book: An Inconvenient Truth, 
standing at 61%. But it again dropped to 49% in 2011, and has grown steadily to 55% in 
2015 (Saad, 2015). Nisbet and Myers (2007) analyzed U.S. polls on climate change for 
20 years from 1986-2007 and found that the number of people who saw global warming 
as a personal problem had increased steadily over time from 27% in 1997 to 52% in 
2007. Results from more recent studies revealed that after 2008, public concern over 
climate change fell again. Gallup Poll surveys found that the number of American people 
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who worried “a great deal” about climate change dropped from 41% in 2007 to 28% in 
2010 and 25% in 2011 (Newport, 2014). As public perceptions can compel or hinder 
political, economic and social action to address particular risks, the fluctuations in 
climate change perceptions have influenced how public policies regarding this 
environmental phenomenon as well as climate change adaptation and mitigation 
measures are shaped (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Leiserowitz, 2006). 
Many factors could shift public attention away from climate change. For example, 
Leiserowitz et al. (2013) posit that the climategate incident in 2009 had significant effects 
on the public’s understanding and concern about global warming. According to their 
findings, in 2008, a year before the incident occurred, 71% of Americans said “yes,” 
global warming is happening. In 2010, this number fell to 57%. Meanwhile, the number 
of people who did not believe that global warming was happening doubled over the two 
years period from 10% to 20%. In addition, in 2008, 57% of respondents said human 
activities were causing climate change. By 2010, this number dropped 10 points to 47%. 
In between 2008 and 2010, the public’s worry about climate change saw a sharp decline. 
Specifically, by 2010, 50% of Americans said they were “somewhat” or “very worried” 
about climate change, falling 13 points from 63% in 2008. These changes in public 
opinion, according to the scholars, were the effects of the notorious climategate.  
Besides the effects of personal factors such as gender (McCright, 2010), race 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011) or political ideology (Leiserowitz et al., 2013) scholars have 
also discovered other factors that could play important roles in public opinion on climate 
change. For instance, after examining 22 years of public opinion data in the U.S., Scruggs 
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and Benegal (2012) suggested that economic insecurity had driven the decline in belief 
about climate change. The two scholars found strong correspondences between the 
percentages of the American public saying climate change was occurring and the 
unemployment rates and inflations over the period. Others contended that local weather 
variations could also affect the public’s political attitude with regards to climate change 
(Egan & Mullin, 2012).  
Among those factors, media coverage of climate change has been found to exert 
strong influence on public opinion on climate change. For example, new reports on the 
climategate in 2009 scandal contributed to the decline in public understanding and 
perception of climate change (Leiserowitz et al., 2013). In another study, Brulle, 
Carmichael, and Jenkins (2012) identified that during the period from 2002 to 2010 these 
included public access to accurate scientific information, elite cues, and movement/ 
countermovement advocacy. The news media’s coverage of climate change, according to 
their findings, was a strong predictor of public opinion on this environmental 
phenomenon. Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins focused on the first level of agenda setting, 
which focuses on the transfer of media salience of climate change from the news’ to the 
public’s agenda.  
However, as a complex issue with different and, in many cases, contrasting views 
about it, examining how climate change is portrayed in the media and, specifically, which 
aspects of it influence public opinion is expected to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of media effects with regards to this issue. This research is not interested 
in the direct transfer of salience from the media attribute agenda to the public attribute 
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agenda. Instead, it focuses on compelling arguments effects, which are concerned with 
the impact of media attribute salience on the salience of climate change as an issue on the 
public agenda.  
Mounting evidence in climate change research has demonstrated that the majority 
of the public still perceives climate change as a distant issue rather than a personal threat, 
which, scientists believe, is hindering climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. 
Poll results have also shown fluctuations in public opinion on the importance of climate 
change. And scholars have long blamed the news media for biased reports on climate 
change, which influenced how much policy support the public shows for this issue (Hart, 
2011; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004).  
With regards to agenda setting, Kim et al. (2012) pointed out that how media 
cover an issue – highlighting or downplaying certain attributes of an issue, influences 
public opinion on that issue. In their study that examined attribute agenda-setting effects 
on Korean public opinion regarding the government’s plan to relocate the country’s 
administrative capital, Seoul, Kim and his colleagues (2012) discovered the salience of 
certain attributes of the issue in the media agenda (i.e. Balanced development; Solution to 
metropolitan problems; and Stimulating the local economy) positively predicted the 
public support for the plan. Another (Tremendous relocation cost) saw a negative 
association with that support. 
Research in mass communication has identified a strong link between news media 
consumption and political activism and participation. For example, Becker, Dalrymple, 
Brossard, Scheufele and Gunther (2010) discovered that attention to news regarding stem 
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cells motivates audiences to engage in actions regarding this controversial issue. 
Specifically, those who consume news on stem cells would be more likely to join a 
demonstration, sign a petition, take part in public discussions or hearings, contact an 
official to express their views, or write a letter to the editor. Numerous other studies 
detected the relationship between news use and civic participation (Boyle & 
Schmierbach, 2009; Kang & Kwak, 2003; Shah, 1998). These testified to the effects of 
news on audiences’ political action engagement.  
 As one of the most widely used theories in the field of mass communication, 
agenda setting has been applied in hundreds studies to investigate the effects of news 
content on public opinion. However, to date, limited amount of agenda-setting research 
has utilized this theoretical framework in researching the influence of news content on 
public intention to engage in issue participation. This study fills that void through 
examining the association between how the media cover climate change and changes in 
public behavioral intention including “(1) write letters, email, or phone government 
officials about global warming, and (2) volunteer with or donate money to an 
organization working to reduce global warming.” In order to do that, this research 
employs the compelling arguments concept as its theoretical groundwork to explicate 
these associations. Thus, it asks: 
RQ2: Which of the various attributes of climate change found in news 
coverage function as compelling arguments for:  
• (RQ2a) salience of climate change in the public agenda? 
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•  (RQ2b) participating in activism? 
Public Political Polarization   
Polarization among the public is not new. Empirical analyses demonstrate that since the 
1970s it has increased dramatically, intensifying political partisanship between 
Republican and Democrat and widening the ideological divide between liberal and 
conservative Americans (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008). Disagreements also arose 
among political scientists on whether or not the ideological or political party divide is 
systematic which implies divergence among the mass public on a broad set of issues or it 
reflects only a split on a consistent set of public issues (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; 
Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2005; Shapiro & Bloch-Elkon, 
2006). No matter which, escalating partisanship among the public does have both healthy 
and detrimental effects on America’s politics. Its beneficial impacts include interest in 
political issues and activities by highly partisan citizens in acquiring political knowledge 
and in participating in political actions. It has also, on the other hand, worried political 
pundits, for numerous reasons including alienation and political dormancy especially 
where consensus is sought to push for changes in public policies (Doherty, 2014; Prior, 
2013; Stroud, 2007).  
Ideological divide among the mass public can be found on a number of 
contentious issues. For example, party identification was detected to be a predictor for the 
split of the public’s views on U.S. foreign policy concerning the Iraq War (Jacobson, 
2010). Henderson and Hillygus (2011) reported a stronger likelihood of opposing 
universal healthcare insurance policies among Republican between 2008 and 2010. In 
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their longitudinal study, Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) detected a sharp divide along 
the party lines on several public issues including (1) aid to Blacks; (2) abortion; (3) 
jobs/living standards; (4) health insurance, and; (5) presidential approval.  
Much like many other controversial issues, since its emergence on the national 
agenda, climate change has seen a sharp divide either ideologically or along party lines. 
For example, McCright and Dunlap (2011) observed that Democrats’ and liberals’ belief 
is closer to scientific consensus about this environmental phenomenon than that of 
Republicans and conservatives. Liberals and Democrats are also more likely to express 
concerns about global warming/ climate change than Republicans and conservatives do. 
According to the results from a recent national survey by the Pew Research Center (Pew 
Research Center, 2015), 76% of liberals say human activities cause climate change, while 
only 29% of conservatives believe so. 
Of the many factors that cause the division in public opinion (e.g. the nature of 
the U.S. political system with two major political parties or disagreements among 
political elites), media have been found to contribute to mass polarization, leading the 
American public to support partisan views on many political issues (Levendusky, 2013). 
Stroud (2010) contends that exposure to consonant media messages could increase 
public’s polarization. She discovered that those who identified themselves as 
conservative Republican and liberal Democrat actively seek to expose themselves to 
likeminded media content, thus causing increased polarization. She discovered that those 
who identified themselves as conservative Republican and liberal Democrat actively seek 
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to expose themselves to likeminded media content, thus causing increased polarization 
among the public 
A number of studies on media and public polarization have been based on the 
theoretical concept of selective exposure, which emphasizes the role of individual 
preferences in choosing media content and its subsequent effects. With regard to climate 
change, scholars have begun to investigate the effects of partisan media on different 
public groups. For example, based on the findings of their recent study testing first level 
agenda-setting effects on partisan publics, Zhao, Rolfe-Redding and Kotcher (2014) 
reported a significant correspondence between the volume of news coverage of climate 
change in partisan media and concerns about this environmental issue among partisan 
publics. Interestingly, the significant correlations were negative for Republican, but 
positive for Democrat, which means Democrats’ concerns about climate change increase 
when media attention to the issue increases; in contrast, Republicans’ concerns decrease 
when the media pay more attention to climate change. Such findings provide empirical 
evidence about how individual differences moderate the effects of agenda setting. 
However, as argued earlier, not all aspects or attributes of climate change in the media 
would exert equal influence on public opinion. Taking a further step to investigate the 
compelling arguments effects of media climate change attributes on partisan publics is 
expected to show a more intricate picture about what moves public opinion and actions. 
This study asks: 
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RQ3: Which of the various attributes of climate change on the media 
agenda have compelling arguments effects on partisan publics (i.e. 
conservative and liberal)? 
In the new media environment, news consumers can seek information that is 
congruent with their views, and recent research has investigated how active people are in 
selecting likeminded information (Feldman et al., 2012; Jang, 2013; Stroud, 2010). While 
selective exposure posits that individuals’ views or preferences lead their control of what 
to expose to, agenda setting is more concerned with media effects on audiences at an 
aggregate level. In other words, the first assumes complete – or at least, high – control by 
the audience in information exposure; the later contends that the media content is 
pervasive and homogeneous – media effects therefore tend be more similar across public 
groups. As the media environment is still in transition, where new media do allow 
individual selectivity, but mainstream media have been found to still have strong effects 
(Shehata & Strömbäck, 2013), perhaps an intersection between the two theoretical 
frameworks would be theoretically and realistically sound. Zhao et al. (2014) found 
stronger first level agenda-setting effects of climate change coverage in partisan media on 
partisan publics. To operationalize this theoretical assumption, this study investigates 
compelling arguments effects of ideological media on ideological publics: 
H2a: Compelling arguments effects, if any, of climate change attributes 
from partisan media will be strongest on respective partisan publics (i.e. 
liberal media and liberal public; conservative media and conservative 
public). 
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 In the groundbreaking Chapel Hill study, McCombs and Shaw (1972) tested the 
media agenda-setting effects on undecided voters, with the assumption that this group 
might be swayed by the media more easily. Although undecided voters are not the same 
as people who identify themselves as independent, the two may share some similarities, 
that is, people who are not leaning to either side might be influenced by the media the 
most. Based on this logic, this research hypothesizes that: 
H2b: Compelling arguments effects, if any, from both independent and 
overall media will be strongest among the independent public.     
Uncertainty has been found shadowing discussions regarding climate change 
since its emergence as a public issue in the national agenda. For the public, uncertainty 
with regards to climate change means a lack of evidence of about its existence, what 
would be the cause of this environmental phenomenon as well as its effects (Weber & 
Stern, 2011). For example, results from the latest Gallup poll survey, which was 
conducted in 2015, reveal that only a little more than half (55%) of Americans believe 
climate change is already happening. According to the survey 41% of the American 
public said natural variations cause climate change and that the increases in the earth 
temperatures have nothing to do with human activities. Two in every three Americans 
said climate change will not pose a serious threat in their lifetime and the issue has 
generally been exaggerated (Saad, 2015). Such skepticism has fueled the division within 
the public, preventing any climate change policies from reaching the mass’ consensus.     
 Reasons for the public’s climate change skepticism are many. Patt and Schrag 
(2003) assert that how climate change information is communicated to the public using 
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the scientific discourse may influence their cognition as well as belief in the issue. For 
example, scientists often talk about climate change or other scientific issue using the 
language of probability, which presents uncertainty about the existence, causes and 
consequences of climate change. The scholars posit that this uncertainty can influence the 
public’s perception of climate change.  
Another important factor that could shape public belief in climate change is the 
public’s personal experience with effects of this environmental phenomenon. Climate 
change itself is an intrinsically difficult science to understand. Greenhouse gases, which 
are its main causes, are invisible. Its effects, in many cases, are geographically and 
temporally distant (Weber & Stern, 2011). This has made it harder for people without 
personal experience with climate change to relate to it. Scholarly research has found that 
public groups with short-term weather experience such as with floods or heat waves tend 
to have stronger belief certainty in the existence of this environmental phenomenon 
(Hamilton & Stampone, 2013; Weber, 2006). Others have also identified such personal 
factors as worldviews (Weber & Stern, 2011), trust in informants (Krosnick, Holbrook, 
Lowe, & Visser, 2006), or exposure to media messages which falsely present climate 
change as an issue scientists still disagree about (Zehr, 2000; Leiserowitz et al., 2013). 
According to scholars, climate change skepticism or belief certainty has important 
implications on public perception, attitudes and actions towards this issue. It could also 
affect public policies on climate change. In their experiment, Corner, Whitmarsh and 
Xenias (2012) discovered that skepticism or belief certainty caused attitude polarization 
about climate change among the public. Heath and Gifford (2006) found that the belief 
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that the world is fragile influences people’s willingness to engage in actions to mitigate 
climate change. O’Connor, Bord and Fisher (1999) identified the relationship between 
belief in the reality of climate change and voluntary actions including effective use of 
transportation and energy saving. These findings suggest that belief certainty could be a 
contingent factor for compelling arguments effects on climate change salience on the 
public agenda and their intentions to take action on climate change. Thus, this study 
predicts: 
H3: Belief certainty will influence the compelling arguments effects, if there 
are any, between media agenda and: 
(H3a) the salience of climate change on the public’s agenda. 
(H3b) the public’s intention to engage in activism. 
A substantial amount of research has examined the influence of news sources on 
the way media messages are communicated to the public. For example, Lasorsa and 
Reese (1990) contended that different types of sources gave distinct perspectives to news 
content regarding the stock market crash in 1987. Although they did not examine the 
effects of source use on audiences, in discussing their research’s implications, the authors 
argued that such usage would have shaped public views on the incident.  
From an attribute agenda-setting perspective, the effect of an attribute on public 
opinion can be different depending on which news sources mention that attribute. Son 
and Weaver (2006), for example, found that attributes of candidates in the U.S. 
presidential election in 2000 had stronger influence on candidates’ public poll standings 
when they were present in reporters’ analyses or polling reports than when mentioned by 
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the candidates themselves, members of a candidate’s party, or members of the competing 
party. These findings suggest that source types can impact the predictability of news 
attributes influence on the public. Taking this approach further, the present research asks: 
RQ4: Which news sources influence the relationships between climate 
change attribute salience in media and the public’s issue salience and 















CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
This study uses two kinds of data, content analysis and survey, for its purpose of 
understanding the attribute agenda-setting effects on public opinion of news coverage 
about climate change.  
Survey Data 
I use secondary data obtained from a series of nationally representative surveys 
managed by the Yale University Project on Climate Change Communication. The 
project, since its inception in 2008, has so far conducted 13 surveys in total. However, 
this dissertation included only 10 waves for several reasons. The first two waves were 
two halves of a survey with a questionnaire that was broken into two parts because of its 
length. Another wave, which was conducted in 2011, was a re-contact of the first two 
surveys. Basically, this survey and the first two waves were a panel. For that reason, they 
were excluded from this study.  
All of the surveys were conducted online by Knowledge Networks on Americans 
18 years or older representing the country’s population. Participants recruited in these 
surveys were randomly sampled from a 50,000-member online panel maintained by 
Knowledge Networks, which created the panel using random digit dialing and address-
based sampling. This allowed the company to reach participants who have both listed and 
unlisted phone numbers and telephone, non-telephone, and cell phone–only households. 
In addition, Knowledge Networks also provided free Internet service and a netbook to 
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participants who did not have computer or Internet access. Participants typically received 
an incentive of $4 to $6 in return for completing two 5- to 20-minute surveys per month. 
The 10 surveys used for this study were completed during the five years between 
2010 and 2014 with two independent surveys being launched each year. The average 
number of respondents participating in each survey is 1,146 (See Table 1). The 
completion rates ranged between 47.1% and 60.9%. The cumulative response rates were 
between 4.2% and 7.1%.1  
Table 1. Information on survey waves 
Survey Date Number of 
respondents 
Completion Rate Cumulative 
Response rate 
W1 12/24/09 – 01/03/10 1001 52.1% 5.8% 
W2 05/14/10 – 06/04/10 1024 59.7% 7.1% 
W3 04/22/11 – 05/11/11 1010 60.9% 6.3% 
W4 10/20/11 – 11/16/11 1000 66.5% 6.2% 
W5 03/12/12 – 03/30/12 1008 65.8% 5.7% 
W6 08/30/12 – 09/12/12 1061 54.1% 5.2% 
W7 04/08/13 – 04/13/13 1045 47.1% 4.2% 
W8 11/23/13 – 12/09/13 1657 48.0% 4.2% 
W9 04/11/14 – 04/21/14 1384 56.5% 5.1% 
W10 10/14/14 – 10/28/14 1275 57.4% 4.9% 
Total 11,465   
 
                                                
1 Cumulative response rate = recruitment rate x profile rate (those who completed questions 
about their demographic profile/ those who initiated their answer with or without completing 
questions about their demographic profile) x completion rate (DiSogra, 2009).  
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DEMOGRAPHICS OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
Of the overall 11,465 participants, 49.6% were male and 50.4% were female. 
Respondents’ education was measured by four categories: Less than high school (8.3%); 
High school (29.6%); Some college (29.8%), and; Bachelor’s degree or higher (32.4%). 
The household median income for all waves was between $60,000 and $74,000. 
Participants’ ages were assessed with four categories: 18-29 (15.3%), 30-44 (25.3%), 45-
59 (30.9%), and 60 or older (30.3%). In terms of race, of the 11,465 respondents, 8,731 
(76.2%) were White/Non-Hispanic; 1,094 (9.5%) were Hispanic; 964 (8.4%) were 
Black/Non-Hispanic; 345 (3%) identified themselves as Other/Non-Hispanic; and 331 
(2.9%) were of the Two Races/Non-Hispanic group.  
Content analysis 
I first chose six publications for content analysis. They included The New York 
Times, USA Today, New York Post, MSNBC, ABC, and Fox News. Of the six The New 
York Times and MSNBC represented liberal media. The New York Post and Fox were 
conservative. USA Today and ABC represented middle ground media. The selection 
criteria were based on several aspects. First, I used Stroud’s approach (2011) which takes 
presidential candidate (dis)approval to identify whether a news publication is 
conservative, liberal or middle ground. In the most recent two presidential elections The 
New York Times endorsed Obama while The New York Post endorsed Republican 
candidates. U.S.A Today chose not to endorse either side. In addition, according to 
previous studies, the three broadcast channels represented three positions in the 
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ideological scale (Feldman, et al., 2012; Groeling, 2008; Morris, 2007; The American 
Presidency Project, 2012).  
However, not all these media were keen on reporting on climate change. For 
example, during the three months between December 11, 2011 and March 11, 2012 
(Wave 5) The New York Post published only six stories about climate change. The 
numbers of articles for this wave were 39 for The New York Times and 16 for USA Today. 
Another example is ABC, which broadcast only five reports about global 
warming/climate change between January 21 and April 21, 2011 (Wave 3). During this 
period, 22 transcripts were retrieved from MSNBC and 18 from Fox News. So, to 
maintain the balance between all the publications, I decided to include only articles from 
The New York Times and MSNBC for liberal media, USA Today for middle ground and 
Fox News for conservative media.  
The time frame for the content analysis was three months prior to the launch of 
each survey. For example, the first survey was conducted between December 24, 2009 
and January 3, 2010. So, all articles from September 23 to December 23 that year were 
collected from the four media. In previous agenda-setting studies, the selected amounts of 
time for media coverage ranged from one week to nine months (Atwood, Sohn & Sohn, 
1978; Wanta, Golan & Lee, 2004). Watt, Mazza and Snyder (1993) found that the time 
for issue salience memory to decay is 300 days. With that, the selection of media 
coverage of three months prior to each survey in this study was within that range. With 
an eye to be not only comprehensive, but also tightly focused, the search terms included 
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three keywords “climate change,” and/or “global warming,” and/or “greenhouse gas” 
either in the lead paragraph or headline of the articles for newspapers publications.  
A different procedure was used for television transcripts. From the experience of 
the author, television transcripts are usually filed into the database with various pieces of 
news in one show. The keywords “climate change,” “global warming,” or “greenhouse 
gas” might not be included in the lead paragraph or in the headline although there was a 
report on climate change in the show. Thus, instead of looking for these keywords in the 
headlines or lead paragraphs, I searched full-text. Transcripts that contained any of the 
three keywords were gathered.   
Searches were performed using the LexisNexis database. After excluding 
duplicates, blog posts, corrections, book and movie reviews, articles for the international 
version of a publication, and letters to the editor, these search terms yielded a total of 931 
articles about climate change from The New York Times and U.S.A Today over the 30 
selected months. For TV transcripts, because I did full-text searches on all shows in 
LexisNexis for the two channels, all transcripts were assessed carefully to ensure they had 
at least one climate change attribute in each report. After eliminating lead-ins, duplicates, 
as well as reports that mentioned climate change in passing without the presence of any 
attributes, I retrieved a total of 592 transcripts from the two broadcast channels about 
climate change that mentioned at least one climate change attribute (See Table 2). In this 
study, I used both editorial pieces and news reports from newspapers, and all shows that 
were broadcast during the selected periods of time on the two television channels. The 
inclusion of editorials and television talk shows is expected to provide a more thorough 
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examination of the media agenda. Extant literature found that media publications use 
similar strategies for editorials as they do for news stories in order to frame or 
demonstrate their agenda with regards to a particular issue (Ryan, 2001), especially for 
such a highly contested topic as climate change (Elsasser & Dunlap, 2012). For this 
study, which includes examining the differences in the agenda of partisan media and their 
influences on partisan publics, the inclusion of editorials is important to provide an 
accurate picture of climate change in the media agenda. 
Table 2. Number of articles by wave 
Wave New York Times USA Today MSNBC Fox 
W1 141 47 33 52 
W2 44 13 27 20 
W3 45 28 22 18 
W4 41 26 23 24 
W5 39 16 14 21 
W6 38 25 24 16 
W7 62 28 50 42 
W8 78 28 23 19 
W9 68 28 40 30 
W10 110 26 48 36 
Total 666 265 304 288 
 
CODING PROCEDURE  
In order to develop the codebook, I first immersed myself in the qualitative coding of 
about 50 randomly selected articles. Cues for coding each attribute were identified and 
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included in the codebook. These attributes are grouped into four larger groups: Issue 
Image, Issue Existence, Issue Remedy, and Issue Linkages (Liu et al., 2011). Each time 
an attribute was mentioned in the text, it was counted once (See Table 3 for details).  
The codebook contains 34 items, including general information on the articles 
(e.g. publication, wave), 12 specific attributes defining the four groups (e.g. Bad Effects, 
No Effects, Existence, No-Existence, etc.), and sources mentioning attributes (e.g. 
politician, reporter, scientist, etc.). The complete codebook is in Appendix A. Two 
graduate students were hired to code the materials. After becoming familiar with the 
codebook through extensive training, coders were assigned 200 of the same articles 
(13%) to code for inter-coder reliability. Coders were instructed to look for the presence 
of the 12 attributes in texts, which were grouped in four large categories including Issue 
Image, Issue Solution, Issue Existence and Issue Linkages. Codebook was adapted from a 
previous attribute agenda-setting study on climate change by Liu, et al. (2011). Inter-
coder reliability tests found satisfactory results. Cohen’s Kappa values ranged from 0.75 












Issue Image  
Bad-Effects: Explicitly mentioning negative consequences of climate 
change/global warming/global warming/ global warming (e.g. ‘environmental 
disaster,’ ‘health risk,’ ‘loss of life,’ ‘threat to infrastructure,’ ‘land 
degradation,’ ‘greater severity and frequency of tropical storms,’ ‘drought,’ 
‘extreme weather,’ ‘snow storm,’ ‘glacier melting,’ ‘polar bear extinction,’ 
‘rising see level,’ ‘influencing water resources,’ etc.) 0.88 
No-Effects: Explicitly stating climate change has no harm. Denying all possible 
effects that are often associated with climate change/global warming/global 
warming. Indicating good effects brought about by climate change/global 
warming/global warming, (‘climate change is not a threat to the earth or human 
kind,’ ‘global warming helps agriculture,’ ‘we need global warming in cold 
area,’ etc.) 0.78 












Table 3 (continued) 
 
Solution: Proposing solutions to mitigate, prevent or adapt to climate 
change/global warming (e.g. ‘cutting greenhouse gases,’ ‘adapting to climate 
change by forest growing,’ ‘using alternative energy like solar, wind to avoid 
warming the earth,’ ‘new policy to curb emission,’ etc.). Stating that countries 
need to work together to fight climate change; (‘UN conferences on climate 
change; the U.S. should make stronger commitments to international climate 
change initiatives’; ‘climate change treaty will engage more countries in the 
world. in the world’; ‘India and China promised to cut greenhouse gases,’ etc.) 0.84 
No-Solution: Explicitly mentioning that no solution is needed or is helpful in 
climate change mitigation, prevention, or adaptation. Adopting other solutions 
will be more helpful than investing in mitigating global warming, (e.g. ‘there is 
nothing human can do about climate change,’ ‘solar energy cannot replace coal 
to cut greenhouse gas,’ ‘investing in clean energy is expensive,’ ‘cutting 
greenhouse gases will slow down the economy,’ ‘no country is doing anything 
to cut greenhouse gases,’ etc.); Mentioning that no cooperation is effective or 
needed for climate change, (e.g. countries in the world are withdrawing from 
climate change treaty; no countries are doing anything to mitigate climate 
change; international conferences discussing climate change/ global warming 






Table 3 (continued) 
 
Issue Existence  
Existence: Mentioning that climate change/global warming does exist, and/or 
human causes climate change/global warming. Reporting scientific evidence of 
climate change.  Stating that a person approves of/supports/believes in climate 
change, that means the person thinks climate change/global warming exists.  0.80 
Non-Existence: Stating that climate change/global warming does not exist, and 
human does not cause climate change/ global warming. Mentioning that a 
person disapproves of/ disbelieves in climate change, that means the person 
think climate change/global warming does not exist (e.g. human make no 
effects on temperature increase; there are not enough facts about climate 
change; climate change is made up by liberal conspiracy; global warming is a 
hoax, a scam; global warming is in doubt, etc.) 0.83 
Issue Linkage  
Energy: Climate change bill may influence the country’s oil production; 
climate change forces us to resort to other types of energy such as wind or solar; 
climate change mitigation efforts will influence oil/electricity prices. 0.77 
Non-Energy: Climate change/global warming is not linked to energy, (e.g. coal 
does not generate as much emission as other types of energy; we have 






Table 3 (continued) 
 
Economy: Mentioning climate change/global warming in association with 
cutting tax, green job, more profit, loss in profit, etc. (e.g. Economic crises de-
prioritize climate change; Companies benefit from higher electricity prices 
because oil prices will go up to offset the cost of climate change mitigation or 
prevention; Businesses will be affected by climate change policies; Coal 
industry will be hurt if we cut carbon emission; Food supply is short because of 
disasters etc.) 0.76 
Non-Economy: Climate change/global warming has no link to economy, (e.g. 
mitigating climate change will not have adverse effects on the economy; 
Economy will not be hurt by adapting to climate change, etc.) 0.77 
Society: Social, health and education problems are linked with climate 
change/global warming, (e.g. more conflicts, crimes, health issued are caused 
by climate change/global warming; social issues such as migration, population 
displacement, poverty are directly associated with climate change/global 
warming; whether climate change/ global warming issue should be taught in 
school; the public should be educated about global warming, etc.) 0.77 
Non-Society: Climate change/global warming has no link with social issues; 
(e.g. climate change/global warming should not be taught in school; there is 
no need to educate the public about greenhouse gases; health problems have 
nothing to do with climate change/ global warming; conflicts and crimes are 
not associated with climate change/ global warming, etc.) 0.75 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Other: Climate change/ global warming is linked with issues other than the 
aforementioned.  0.93 
 
Coders also were instructed to code for sources that mentioned each attribute. I 
used seven categories including scientist (e.g. scientist, scientific study, research 
institution) politician (e.g. politician, report, press releases by political institution), 
business people, activist, regular people, reporter, and other. These source categories 
were adopted from Son and Weaver’s study (2006) but were modified to suite the nature 
of source use for climate change news. For example, Son and Weaver used candidates as 
a type of source because their study focused on the agenda-setting effects of news on 
public opinion. This study did not use that source category. However, it included the 
scientist category because climate change is a scientific issue.  
After coders identified sources, they also coded for the sum of attributes 
mentioned by each of the sources. For example, if in a story, Bad-Effects is mentioned 
five times, with a scientist speaking of it two times, while the reporter mentioning it three 
times, the number two will be assigned to the scientist category; and the number three 
will be assigned to the reporter category (See Figure 2 for coding examples). Results of 
Cohen’s Kappa tests showed acceptable levels of intercoder reliability, which ranged 




Figure 2: Sample coding  
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Measurement of the Variables 
For the independent variables, the salience of the attributes of climate change was 
assessed by summing the number of times each attribute was mentioned in the media for 
the three months before each survey was conducted. The sums of attribute mentions in 
text by sources were also recorded to investigate the influence of sources.  
For the dependent variables, the public salience of climate change was measured 
by answers to three questions in the surveys:  
(1) “How worried are you about global warming?” (1 = not at all; 4 = very);  
(2) “How important is the issue of global warming to you personally?” (1 = not at 
all; 5 = extremely) and;  
(3) Here are some issues now being discussed in Washington, D.C. [Global 
warming was one of the issues asked about]. Do you think each of these issues should be 
a low, medium, high, or very high priority for the next president and Congress?  
This measurement of salience allow for capturing several aspects of the public 
issue salience including their national interests and personal concerns about the issue 
(McCombs, 1999).  
Unlike the first and third questions, which were both on 4-point scales, the second 
one was a five-point scale. Therefore, I converted it into a four-point using the formula: 
new-X = 3/4* old-X + 1/4. This transformation turned all values of 5 in the old variable 
to 4, and 1 remained 1.  
I used Cronbach’s Alpha to test for internal consistency among the three public 
salience variables. Results suggested an acceptable level of consistency with a coefficient 
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of 0.87. I then combined the three variables using the formula: New public salience = 
Mean (V1+V2+V3). Across the 10 waves, this new variable has a mean of 2.26 (SD = 
0.84). 
The activism measure was created by combining two items asking respondents 
about their intention to engage in the following actions over the next 12 months: (1) 
Write letters, email, or phone government officials about global warming, and (2) 
Volunteer with or donate money to an organization working to reduce global warming. 
Respondents were asked to rate their intention on a three-point Likert scale (1 = less 
often, 2 = about the same, and 3 = more often). Pearson’s correlation tests were 
performed on the two variables. Results showed a significant association between them (r 
= +0.72, p < 0.01). They were then added together and divided by two. The index had a 
mean of 1.93 (SD = 0.53). 
Political ideology was assessed on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = very liberal to 
5 = very conservative (Mean across 10 waves = 3.18, SD=1.05). For the purpose of this 
study, political ideology was divided into three groups: Liberals (N = 2,614) are those 
who chose two response options 1 = very liberal and 2 = somewhat liberal; Independents 
(4,523) identified themselves as 3 = moderate or middle ground, and; Conservatives 
(4,023) include those who saw themselves as 4 = somewhat conservative and 5 = very 
conservative. Across the 10 waves, 305 respondents either refused to answer or skipped 
this question.  
Belief certainty was measured by asking respondents about how sure they are that 
global warming is happening. Response includes four options: 1 = not at all sure; 2 = 
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somewhat sure; 3 = very sure, and; 4 = extremely sure. For this study, this variable was 
transformed into two groups: Low certainty consists of answers saying that respondents 
are “not at all sure” and/or “somewhat sure” about the existence of global warming. High 
certainty, on the other hand includes all responses of those who thought they were “very 
sure” or “extremely sure” that climate change or global warming is happening. 
Data Analysis 
The unit of analysis in this study is waves instead of individual articles or 
respondents. Without the presence of a media use variable in the surveys, which did not 
allow for merging the content with the survey data, I created a “secondary” database that 
contains both content analysis and survey data. For each wave, the mentions of attributes 
in the media were summed to measure these independent variables. For example, in 
Wave 1 or during the three months between September 23 and December 23, 2009 (The 
survey for this wave was conducted on December 24, 2009) there were a total of 273 
articles from all four media outlets about climate change, which mentioned the solutions 
for climate change 435 times. This value of 435 was entered as representing the Solution 
attribute in the media agenda for the first wave. Similar procedures were used for the 
other nine waves for this attribute to generate respective values of 207, 177, 144, 159, 
252, 280, 235, 265 and 358. These values were used to create the column for the Solution 
variable in the “secondary” dataset.  
Dependent variables were calculated using means of responses to questions in 
each wave. For example, in Wave 1,001 people participated in the survey. The index 
mean of the climate change salience (consisting of three variables, see pages 47-48 for 
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more details) for the first wave was 2.24. Similar calculations were conducted for the 
other nine waves to generate the respective index means of 2.38, 2.39, 2.32, 2.31, 2.39, 
2.34, 2.31, 2.31 and 2.32. These 10 values were used to represent the public climate 
change salience in the “secondary” data. This method was adapted from a previous 
agenda-setting research by Saldana, et al., (2013) where there was no media use variable 
available.  
To examine RQ1, which asks about attribute salience on the media agenda, I used 
descriptive data for the comparisons. 
To test H1, which asserts that conservative media will be more likely to 
emphasize dismissive attributes than liberal and middle ground media (H1a) and liberal 
media will be more likely to emphasize accepting attributes than conservative and middle 
ground media, one-way ANOVA was adopted. Before ANOVA was used, tests of 
normality and homogeneity of variances were conducted on the 12 attributes. Results 
showed violations of assumptions for both. In terms of test of normality, the variables 
were not normally distributed, with skewness ranging from 2.43 to 15.27 and kurtosis 
ranging from 8.84 to 331.04. Shapiro Wilk’s coefficients were all significant with p < 
0.001. Although scholars posited that analysis of variance is robust to non-normally 
distributed samples, especially when the sample size is large (in this case: 1,523) and 
when there is a similar pattern of skewness (in this case all variables were positively 
skewed) (Hopkins & Weeks, 1990), still, transformation procedures were applied to 
reduce non-normality of the variables (Osborne, 2010). I used Box and Cox’s approach 
(1964), which required taking the square roots of all values in the variable to be 
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transformed. For the most part, the transformation was successful with nine variables 
having skewness and eight having Kurtosis values smaller than 2 (See Table 4). In terms 
of violations of the assumption of homogeneity of variances, test results showed all 
Levene’s values were statistically significant with p < 0.001. I used Welch’s coefficient 
values for the correction of the F-tests (Brown & Forsythe,1974; Tomarken & Serlin, 
1986). In addition, Bonferroni’s correction tests were also conducted to counteract the 
problems with multiple comparisons between the independent variable – media type – 















Table 4.  Skewness and Kurtosis of attributes before and after transformation 
Attributes Skewness Kurtosis 
 Original Reduced Original Reduced 
Issue Image     
Bad-Effects 3.17 .82 16.29 .19 
No-Effects 2.77 1.7 8.84 1.5 
Issue Remedy     
Solution 2.65 .52 12.87 .47 
No-Solution 4.48 1.27 45.57 .86 
Issue Existence     
Existence 2.43 .49 9.25 .54 
No-Existence 3.84 1.21 23.59 .72 
Issue Linkages     
Energy 3.0 1.4 13.53 .17 
No-Energy 4.2 3.5 18.26 10.6 
Economy 3.62 .87 25.06 .29 
No-Economy 3.66 2.9 13.77 6.9 
Society 3.99 1.9 22.98 2.91 
No-Society 15.27 8.07 331.04 73.86 
 
Zero-order Pearson’s correlations were used to answer and to test all the rest of 
the RQs and Hs. Although all the correlation tests were bivariate and independent from 
one another running multiple correlation tests on the same variables may increase the rate 
of incorrectly rejecting the null hypotheses. In this dissertation I report the results using 
both the “liberal” and “conservative” approaches in analyzing the data. Specifically, in 
the “liberal” view, the p values or significance of all correlation tests were kept at the 
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traditional 0.05 level. In the conservative approach, Bonferroni’s approach was used. 
Significant levels were adjusted using the formula 0.05 (regular significant level) x 1/m 
(m = number of tests) to maintain the family wise error rate.  
For RQ2 (a, b) independent variables were the 18 attribute variables. Dependent 
variables were the public’s issue salience and intention to engage in activism.  
To answer RQ3 on the compelling arguments effects of the overall media’s 
climate change attributes on ideological publics, I used the cumulated sums of the 12 
attributes from all four publications as the independent variables. Means of climate 
change issue salience are the dependent variables and were calculated separately for 
liberal and conservative respondents. I correlated the 18 independent variables with each 
of the two dependent variables.  
To test H2a, which predicts stronger compelling arguments effects of partisan 
media on partisan publics than those of the salience of attributes in all media the 
independent variables were the salience of media climate change attributes. The 
dependent variables were climate change issue salience in ideological and overall public 
agendas. I first created new variables with media climate change attribute salience by 
media type. A similar approach was used for the public agenda. Basically, three media 
agendas (i.e. overall, liberal, and conservative) and two public agendas (i.e. liberal, and 
conservative) were identified. I conducted a series of correlation tests and compared the 
results in order to see if there are any differences in these relationships. 
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To test H2b, which predicts strongest compelling arguments effects from both 
independent and overall media on independent than on liberal and conservative publics I 
identified the relationships between media attributes in both the overall and middle 
ground media agendas and climate change issue salience in the agenda of independent 
respondents. Results of the correlation tests then were compared against those for liberal 
and conservative respondents.  
To test H3 (a, b), which assumes the effects of belief certainty in the existence of 
climate change/global warming on the relationships between media attributes and public 
issue salience and intention to engage in climate change activism I used attribute salience 
in the media agenda as independent variables. Dependent variables were issue salience 
and activism engagement divided into two groups of respondents: high and low belief 
certainty. Test results were then compared to identify differences. 
In order to answer RQ4 about source effects on the relationships between media 
attribute salience, I used media attribute salience stratified by sources as independent 




CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
The purpose of this study is to understand the media coverage of climate change 
and its compelling arguments effects on the public in the five years from 2009 to 2014. In 
this section, I will present the results of data analyses, divided into five major parts. The 
first part focuses on the media climate change attribute agenda and how attributes varied 
across media types. The second is concerned with the compelling arguments effects of 
climate change attributes on all audiences. The third, however, goes further to investigate 
these effects on various public groups including liberals, conservatives and independents. 
The fourth is concerned with the moderating role of climate change belief certainty – an 
individual predisposition factor. The last examines the influence of sources on 
compelling arguments effects.  
Media Agenda of Climate Change 
RQ1 asks which attributes of climate change are salient in the news. Descriptive data 
show that in the 30 months studied, a total of 16,811 times climate change attributes were 
mentioned in the four publications examined in detail. As detailed earlier, media climate 
change attributes were divided into the four larger groups of attributes including Issue 
Image (i.e. Bad-Effects and No-Effects); Issue Remedy (i.e. Solution and No-Solution); 
Issue Existence (i.e. Existence and No-Existence, and; Issue Linkages (i.e. Energy and 
No-Energy; Economy and No-Economy, and; Society and No-Society) (See Figure 2 and 
Table 4 for details).   
 
 57 
Figure 3: Four groups of macro attributes of climate change (N= 16,811) 
  
In terms of a single attribute, Bad-Effects in the issue image group was the most 
salient (3,220) in the media agenda. The media preferred to portray climate change in 
association with such negative consequences of this environmental phenomenon as rising 
temperatures, glacier melting, or more frequent severe weather among others.  
The second most salient attribute of climate change was Solution (2,512) in the 
Issue Linkages group. Existence (2,205) in the Issue Existence group was the third most 
salient attribute. Of all the single attributes, denying linkages between climate change and 
multiple issues appeared most infrequently in the media agenda. Specifically, No-Society 
was at the bottom of the list, being mentioned only 79 times. Even though some might 
deny climate change, explicitly rejecting the link between this environmental 
phenomenon and other issues was not the preferred strategy. Overall, the Issue Linkages 
group had the highest frequency of being mentioned with a total of 5,576 times attributes 






Table 5. Number of attributes by wave of data collection 
Attribute W1 (2009) W2 (2010) W3 (2010) W4 (2011) W5 (2011) W6 (2012) W7 (2012) W8 (2013) W9 (2013) W10 (2014) Total 
Issue Image 
Bad Effects 224 (7%) 301(9.4% 175 (5.4%) 196 (6.1%) 184 (5.7%) 534(16.6%) 435 (13.5%) 368 (11.4%) 401 (12.5%) 402 (12.5%) 3220 (100%) 
No Effects 163 (21.8%) 32 (4.3%) 69 (9.2%) 83 (11.1%) 58 (7.8%) 54 (7.2%) 59 (7.9%) 94 (12.6%) 78 (10.4%) 58 (7.8%) 748 (100%) 
Total 387 (9.6%) 333 (8.4%) 244 (6.2%) 279 (7.0%) 242 (6.1%) 588 (14.8%) 494 (12.5%) 462 (11.6%) 479 (12.1%) 460 (11.6%) 3968 (100%) 
Issue Remedy 
Solution 435 (17.3%) 207 (8.2%) 177 (7.1%) 144 (5.7%) 159 (6.3%) 252 (10%) 280 (11.2%) 235 (9.4%) 265 (10.6%) 358 (14.3%) 2512 (100%) 
No Solution 358 (31.4%) 53 (4.7%) 71 (6.2%) 94 (8.2%) 56 (4.9%) 101 (8.9%) 127 (11.1%) 84 (7.4%) 106 (9.3%) 91 (8.0%) 1141 (100%) 
Total 793 (21.7%) 260 (7.1%) 248 (6.8%) 238 (6.5%) 215 (5.9%) 353 (9.7%) 407 (11.1%) 319 (8.7%) 371 (10.2%) 449 (12.3%) 3653 (100%) 
Issue Existence 
Existence 360 (16.3%) 137 (6.2%) 76 (3.5%) 184 (8.4%) 94 (4.3%) 242 (11%) 252 (11.4%) 220 (10%) 332 (15.1%) 308 (14%) 2205 (100%) 
No-Existence 391 (27.8%) 97 (6.9%) 43 (3.1%) 174 (12.3%) 80 (5.7%) 104 (7.4%) 140 (9.9%) 118 (8.4%) 164 (11.6%) 98 (7.0%) 1409 (100%) 
Total 751 (20.8%) 234 (6.5%) 119 (3.3%) 358 (9.9%) 174 (4.8%) 346 (9.6%) 392 (10.8%) 338 (9.4%) 496 (13.7%) 406 (11.2%) 3614 (100%) 
Issue Linkage 
Energy 252 (11.7%) 174 (8.1%) 160 (7.4%) 65 (3.0%) 102 (4.8%) 148 (6.9%) 298 (13.9%) 193 (9.0%) 341 (15.9%) 415 (19.3%) 2148 (100%) 
No-Energy 34 (14.1%) 16 (6.6%) 14 (5.8%) 11 (4.6%) 9 (3.7%) 12 (5%) 43 (17.8%) 16 (6.6%) 45 (18.7%) 41 (17%) 241 (100%) 
Economy 454 (23.8%) 118 (6.2%) 95 (5%) 76 (4.0%) 113 (5.9%) 132 (6.9%) 229 (12%) 198 (10.4%) 212 (11.1%) 284 (14.9%) 1911 (100%) 
No-Economy 57 (21%) 13 (4.8%) 4 (14.8%) 14 (5.1%) 12 (4.4%) 18 (6.6%) 48 (17.7%) 29 (10.7%) 42 (15.5%) 35 (12.9%) 272 (100%) 
Society 131 (14.2%) 62 (6.7%) 55 (5.9%) 45 (4.9%) 42 (4.5%) 49 (5.3%) 101 (10.9%) 108 (11.7%) 122 (13.2%) 210 (21.7%) 925 (100%) 
No-Society 12 (15.1%) 2 (3.5%) 9 (11.4%) 15 (19%) 15 (19%) 0 (0%) 2 (2.5%) 2 (2.5%) 12 (15.2%) 10 (12.7%) 79 (100%) 




Table 6. Means of salience of climate change in the public’s agenda and behavioral 
intention  
Variable W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 
Salience 2.24 2.38 2.29 2.32 2.31 2.39 2.34 2.31 2.31 2.32 
Behavior 1.89 1.94 1.91 1.92 1.93 1.95 1.95 1.92 1.94 N/A 
 
H1a predicts that conservative media will be more likely to emphasize dismissive 
attributes (i.e. No-Effects, No-Solution, No-Existence, etc.). One-way ANOVAs 
revealed statistically significance Welch’s results with F values ranging from F (2, 630.1) 
= 7.5 p = 0.001 for No-Society to F (2, 608.53) = 61.1 p = 0.001 for No-Econmy (See 
Table 7). This means that there are differences in the means of attributes used in articles 
from different media types. A closer look at Bonferroni’s correction test results showed 
the means of dismissive attributes per article in the conservative media were significantly 
higher than those in the liberal and middle ground media. H1a was strongly supported 








Table 7.  One-way ANOVA results for dismissive attributes by media type 
Attributes Welch’s F value Liberal Media Middle ground Conservative 
M SD MD M SD MD M SD 
No-Effects F (2, 517.32) = 42*** .24 .56 -.44*** .21 .49 -.47*** .69 .79 
No-Solution F (2, 545.11) = 18.7*** .47 .71 -.18** .28 .58 -.36*** .64 .85 
No-Existence F (2, 630) = 53*** .48 .72 -.53*** .32 .60 -.69*** 1.01 .95 
No-Energy F (2, 612.07) = 16.8*** .10 .38 -.09** .03 .21 -.16*** .20 .47 
No-Economy F (2, 650.83) = 61.1*** .15 .45 -.11** .01 .12 -.25*** .26 .55 
No-Society F (2, 630.12) = 7.5** .03 .21 -.05** .01 .09 -.07** .08 .33 
Notes: M = Mean of attribute mentions/ article; SD = Standard Deviation; MD = Mean 
differences against the means of attribute mentions on the conservative media agenda 
with Bonferroni’s correction results; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
H1b hypothesizes that liberal media will be more likely to emphasize accepting 
attributes (i.e. Bad-Effects, Solution, Existence, Energy, etc.). Results from ANOVA 
Welch tests indicated statistically significant differences for all accepting attributes 
between the three media agendas in Welch’s F values which ranged from F (2, 592.45) = 
36.54 p < 0.001 for Economy to F (2, 608.53) = 114.09 p < 0.001 for Solution (See 
Table 8). According to the Bonferroni’s correction results, the means of accepting 
attribute mentions on the liberal media agenda were significantly higher than those on the 
conservative media agenda. The means of three accepting attributes including Solution, 
Energy and Economy on the liberal media agenda were significantly higher than those in 
the middle ground media agenda. The means of two attributes (e.g. Existence and 
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Society) in the middle ground media were significantly higher than those in the liberal 
media. Bad-Effects, however, did not see any statistically significant difference between 
the means of this attribute in the two media agendas. This indicates that liberal media are 
more likely to highlight climate change accepting attributes than conservative media. 
They are also more likely to emphasize solutions to climate change and the links between 
this environmental phenomenon and the issues of Energy and Economy than middle 
ground media. H1b is partially supported. 
Table 8.  One-way ANOVA results for accepting attributes by media type 
Attributes Welch’s F value Conservative Middle ground Liberal 
M SD MD M SD MD M SD 
Bad-Effects F (2, 612.19) = 111.65*** .41 .99 -.73*** 1.1 1.1 -.03 1.14 1.11 
Solution F (2, 608.53) = 114.09*** .42 .64 -.32*** .75 .73 -.39*** 1.14 .90 
Existence F (2, 629) = 107.72*** .45 .61 -.78*** 1.2 .66 +.35*** .88 .89 
Energy F (2, 654.29) = 58.18*** .42 .67 -.46*** .40 .69 -.49*** .89 1.03 
Economy F (2, 656.37) = 36.54*** .60 .80 -.44*** .63 .81 -.41*** 1.04 1.05 
Society F (2, 630.12) = 42.01*** .13 .38 -.31*** .29 .61 +.17** .44 .77 
Notes: M = Mean of attribute mentions/ article; SD = Standard Deviation; MD = Mean 
differences against the means of attribute mentions on the liberal media agenda with 
Bonferroni’s correction results; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
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Compelling arguments effects on all audiences 
To examine the relationship between the media coverage and the public agenda 
regarding this controversial issue, RQ2a inquired about the compelling arguments effects 
of specific media attributes on the salience of climate change on the public’s agenda. 
Pearson’s correlation test results showed three attributes on the media agenda were 
negatively correlated with the public’s perceived importance of climate change. They 
were No-Effects (r = -0.83, p<0.01), No-Solution (r = -0.63, p<0.05 and No-Society (r = 
-0.64, p<0.05) (See Table 9). This shows that the more the media say climate change 
doesn’t have any effects, there is no solution that would work, or discredit the link 
between climate change and social issues; the more likely the public would think climate 
change is an important issue. After Bonferroni’s correction measures were applied, the 
significance level was raised to 0.0042 (0.05/12). The only relationship between No-
Effects and the public’s perceived importance of climate change remained significant (r 
= -0.83, p = 0.003).  
In short, examining the effects of overall media climate change attributes on the 
public without taking into account their ideologies would lead to a conclusion that only 
dismissive attributes would decrease the public’s perceived importance of climate 
change. 
RQ2b was concerned with the extent to which media climate change attributes 
motivate the public to engage in activism. According to results of the Pearson’s 
correlations analyses, only Bad-Effects (r = +0.71, p<0.05) was positively associated 
with the public intention to engage in activism. This shows that the frequency of 
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mentions of negative consequences events could motivate the public in taking actions to 
fight climate change. Another attribute that had negatively significant effects on the 
public’s intention to get involved in climate change activism was No-Effects (r = -0.81, 
p<0.01). 
When correction measures were applied, which means the p values or significance 
levels for all 18 correlations on each variable would be adjusted to 0.0042 
(0.05/12=0.0042), none remained significant.   
Compelling arguments effects on different audience groups  
RQ3 asked about the differences in compelling arguments effects of the overall media 
agenda on partisan publics. Results of Pearson’s correlation tests showed that only Bad-
Effects exerted strong positive influence on the salience of climate change on the agenda 
of liberal publics (r = +0.96, p<0.001). This means that the more the media mention 
negative consequences of climate change, the more important liberal audiences think the 
issue is. After Bonferroni’s corrections were used (p = 0.0042) the relationship between 
this attribute and public salience remained statistically significant. 
Seven attributes in the overall media agenda had negatively significant 
associations with the conservative public’s perceived importance of climate change. 
Those included No-Effects (r = -0.77, p<0.01); Solution (r = -0.74, p<0.05); No-
Solution (r = -0.66, p<0.05); Existence (r = -0.67, p<0.05); Economy (r = -0.83, 
p<0.01); No-Economy (r = -0.73, p<0.05); and Society (r = -0.76, p<0.05). Of those 
attributes three were dismissive and three were accepting. This shows that when the 
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media mention negative consequences of climate change, solutions to the phenomenon, 
the evidence of its existence, the link or lack of link it has with economic and social 
issues, conservative audiences’ perceived importance of it would decrease. Again, 
Bonferroni’s corrections were used. Test results indicated that only Economy was 
significant at the corrected alpha of 0.0042.  
There were no statistically significant effects of media climate change attributes 
on independents. 
In sum, the results indicate that for liberal publics the more frequently the media 
discuss bad effects of climate change liberals are more likely to perceive it as an 
important issue. In contrast, the more frequently the media report on climate change 
attributes, the salience of the issue decreases among conservative publics.  
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Table 9. Compelling arguments effects from different media on the salience of climate change among different public groups. 
Notes: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
 




















& All public 
groups 
Issue Image        
Bad-Effects +0.96*** -0.72* -0.31 +0.96*** +0.07 +0.31 +0.59 
No-Effects -0.21 -0.62 -0.23 -0.35 -0.77** -0.30 -0.83** 
Issue Remedy        
Solution +0.65* -0.72* -0.07 +0.30 -0.74* -0.09 -0.39 
No-Solution -0.09 -0.56 +0.05 -0.20 -0.66* -0.08 -0.63 
Issue Existence        
Existence +0.64* -0.53 -0.10 +0.46 -0.67* +0.03 -0.25 
No-Existence +0.27 -0.58 +0.34 -0.24 -0.59 +0.01 -0.59 
Issue Linkages        
Energy +0.63 -0.75* -0.58 +0.55 -0.61 -0.06 -0.16 
No-Energy +0.26 +0.02 +0.28 +0.43 -0.59 +0.01 -0.25 
Economy +0.62 -0.65* -0.23 +0.35 -0.83** -0.28 -0.48 
No-Economy +0.18 +0.08 +0.34 +0.42 -0.73* -0.13 -0.39 
Society +0.40 -0.30 -0.21 +0.41 -0.76* -0.32 -0.32 
No-Society -0.33 -0.07 +0.34 -0.61 -0.33 -0.43 -0.64* 
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H2a predicted stronger compelling arguments effects of partisan media on 
partisan publics than those of all media. Pearson’s correlation test results partially 
supported this hypothesis. Specifically, three climate change attributes on the liberal 
media agenda had statistically significant relationships with liberal respondents’ 
perceived importance compared to one attribute from all media. All three were positive. 
These three attributes were Bad-Effects (r = +0.96, p<0.001), Solution (r = +0.65, 
p<0.05) and Existence (r = +0.64, p<0.05). In short, the number of attributes on the 
liberal media agenda that had significant relationships with liberal publics’ perceived 
importance of climate change is larger than that of all media publications. This supports 
H2a. After Bonferroni’s corrections, which raised the significance level to 0.0042, only 
Bad-Effects had statistically and positively significant association with the liberal 
public’s assessment of the importance of this environmental phenomenon (p = 0.000017). 
For conservative media, test results showed that only Energy was significantly 
associated with the conservative public’s perceived importance of climate change (r = -
0.68, p<0.05). This is a much weaker influence, compared with seven statistically 
significant links between attributes from the overall media agenda and conservative’s 
assessment of the importance of climate change. The hypothesis is not supported among 
conservatives. While both the attribute agendas of conservative and all media had 
negative effects, more of the attributes on the all media agenda had negative effects. 
Overall, H2a is only partly supported. 
H2b hypothesized that compelling arguments effects from both overall and 
middle ground media will be strongest among independents or moderates. This 
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hypothesis is not supported. In fact, media attributes from the overall as well as middle 
ground media agenda had no significant relationships with independents’ perceived 
importance of climate change. This means the independents are not likely to be swayed 
by the media agenda vis-à-vis climate change.  
Certainty of belief in climate change 
H3a predicted that certainty of belief in the existence of climate change will influence the 
relationship between media attribute agendas and public issue salience. Statistical test 
results showed that two attributes, Bad-Effects (r = +0.87, p<0.001and No-Society (r = -
0.80, p<0.01) had strong compelling arguments effects among the respondents who are 
more certain that climate change is happening (See Table 10). In contrast, no statistically 
significant effects of media climate change attributes were observed among members of 
the lower certainty group. This indicates the media attribute agenda on climate change 
influences a segment of the public who are certain about the existence of the issue. After 
Bonferroni’s correction measures were adopted, only Bad-Effects still had a significant 
relationship with the perceived importance of climate change among those with high 
belief certainty. This means, belief certainty does influence the relationship between this 
media attribute and the public’s assessment of the importance of climate change. 
H3b predicts significant effects of belief certainty on the relationships between 
media attributes and the public’s intention to engage in activism. Statistical analyses 
showed that among those with higher certainty in the existence of climate change, 
mentioning Bad-Effects (r = +0.84, p<0.01) motivated them to take actions to battle 
climate change. This means the portrayal of climate change in terms of negative or 
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disastrous consequences in the media have strong effects on people who believe in the 
existence of the phenomenon. After Bonferroni’s corrections, Bad-Effects did not see a 
statistically significant relationship with the intention of engaging in activism among the 
public of both groups.  
Table 10. Compelling arguments effects on low and high certainty groups 
 
Attributes Low Certainty High Certainty 
 A B A B 
Issue Image     
Bad-Effects +0.12 -0.33 +0.87*** +0.84** 
No-Effects -0.33 -0.56 -0.42 -0.47 
Issue Remedy     
Solution +0.07 -0.49 +0.12 -0.20 
No-Solution -0.16 -0.42 -0.18 -0.46 
Issue Existence     
Existence -0.01 -0.59 +0.26 +0.19 
No-Existence -0.14 -0.48 -0.17 -0.43 
Issue Linkages     
Energy +0.29 -0.14 +0.16 +0.24 
No-Energy +0.19 -0.04 +0.08 +0.19 
Economy -0.08 -0.59 +0.03 -0.10 
No-Economy -0.04 -0.40 +0.09 -0.02 
Society +0.11 -0.51 0.00 -0.01 
No-Society -0.29 +0.26 -0.80** -0.48 
Note: A = Issue salience; B = Intention to engage in activism 
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Source Effect Analysis  
RQ4 asked about the influence of source use in the news on the compelling arguments 
effects of media attributes on public perceived importance of climate change and action. 
Test results indicated that of all the sources, reporters had the strongest influence on the 
relationships between the media attribute agenda and the public’s importance assessment 
of climate change. When mentioned by reporters four attributes were significantly 
associated with public climate change salience. Of those attributes mentioned by 
reporters Bad-Effects was the only that was positively correlated with public issue 
salience of climate change (r = +0.66, p<0.05).  This means the more reporters/TV show 
hosts mention climate change’s negative consequences the public would be the more 
likely that the public would rate the issue important. Three negatively significant 
correlations between reporter-mentioned attributes and public opinion and intention 
regarding climate change were between No-Effects (r = -0.65, p<0.05), No-Solution (r = 
-0.66, p<0.05) and Economy (r = -0.65, p<0.05). This indicates that the more frequently 
journalists mention there is no effects associated with climate change; no solution to this 
problem, and its link with economic issues the more likely the public would attribute the 
responsibilities to individuals. (See Table 11 for more details).  
Journalist-mentioned attributes had no effects on the public’s intention to engage 
in activism with respect to climate change. 
Politicians were the second most influential sources regarding public climate 
change salience. Of the attributes mentioned by this type of source, two had statistically 
significant agenda-setting effects on public opinion including No-Solution (r = -0.66, 
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p<0.05) and Existence (r = -0.65, p<0.05). This indicates that when politicians 
mentioned there is no solution to climate change or that climate change is happening, the 
public’s assessment of the importance of climate change decreases.  
Two politician-mentioned attributes had statistically and negatively significant 
effects on the public’s intention to engage in activism including No-Solution (r = -0.73, 
p<0.05) and No-Society (r = -0.82, p<0.01). This means when politicians’ mentioning of 
these two dismissive attributes discourages the public from engaging in climate change 
activism. 
Scientists also had some influence on public opinion and behavior toward climate 
change. The frequency of mentions of Bad-Effects (r = +0.70, p<0.05) by scientists had 
statistically and positively significant effects on the public’s behavioral intention with 
regards to climate change.  
To maintain the family-wise error rate of the correlation, again significance level 
adjustments (p = 0.05/84 = 0.0006) were adopted. Results showed no association stayed 
significant. 
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Table 11. Correlation coefficients of relationships between attributes mentioned by sources in the media and public 
assessment of issue importance and intention to engage in activism 
Attributes Salience Activism 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
Issue Image               
Bad-Effects +0.60 -0.07 +0.48 +0.12 +0.46 +0.66* -0.08 +0.70* +0.23 +0.51 +0.41 +0.28 +0.59 +0.12 
Good-Effects -0.42 -0.59 -0.01 -0.32 -0.65 -0.65* -0.28 -0.50 -0.52 -0.07 -0.16 -0.51 -0.65 -0.30 
Issue Remedy               
Solution +0.29 -0.61 +0.01 +0.03 -0.57 -0.02 -0.09 +0.27 -0.58 -0.24 +0.34 -0.17 +0.32 -0.15 
No-Solution -0.51 -0.66* -0.07 -0.02 +0.25 -0.66* +0.08 -0.39 -0.73* -0.10 +0.38 +0.41 -0.61 +0.48 
Issue Existence               
Existence +0.08 -0.65* -0.17 +0.02 -0.33 +0.15 +0.11 +0.33 -0.53 +0.12 +0.26 -0.43 -0.25 +0.08 
No-Existence -0.37 -0.37 +0.23 +0.02 +0.19 -0.63 -0.14 -0.48 -0.33 +0.44 +0.29 +0.43 -0.67 +0.18 
Issue Linkage               
Energy +0.20 -0.55 -0.02 -0.07 -0.14 -0.05 -0.01 +0.61 -0.42 -0.22 +0.16 -0.49 +0.33 N/A 
No-Energy -0.42 -0.29 +0.00 -0.09 +0.30 -0.22 -0.01 -0.61 -0.13 +0.07 +0.23 +0.58 +0.23 N/A 
Economy +0.08 -0.57 +0.32 -0.10 -0.05 -0.65* -0.07 +0.26 -0.34 +0.34 +0.09 -0.29 -0.50 -0.15 
No-Economy -0.25 -0.53 +0.04 -0.04 +0.16 -0.38 -0.01 -0.46 -0.35 +0.34 +0.42 -0.17 +0.00 N/A 
Society -0.02 -0.40 +0.09 -0.03 -0.56 -0.40 +0.17 +0.27 -0.62 +0.09 +0.02 -0.60 -0.30 +0.02 
No-Society -0.14 -0.65 N/A -0.11 +0.11 -0.34 N/A -0.01 -0.82** N/A +0.10 -0.09 -0.16 N/A 
Note: S1 = Scientist; S2 = Politician; S3 = Business people; S4 = Activist; S5 = Regular people; S6 = Reporter/Journalist; S7 = Other 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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CHAPTER 5 – DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the findings of the study, reviewing them in the 
larger context of scholarly research in this specific area as well as juxtaposing them 
against climate change social realities. In the second part, conclusions will be drawn 
based on the research findings and implications. Also, I will address the limitations of 
this study and provide suggestions for future research. 
Discussion 
This study is one of a very few studies that examine the salience of climate change 
attributes in the media longitudinally (Liu et al., 2011), and perhaps is the first that has 
done so in U.S. national media. Among all 12 single attributes found in the media 
coverage, Bad-Effects was most salient. This is in line with results of past research (Hart 
& Feldman, 2014), which reported that the news media primarily presented climate 
change as a threat. There are several explanations for this. First, relating the threatening 
effects of climate change to our everyday life helps make this scientifically complex and 
psychologically distant issue more understandable and relatable to the public (Binder, 
Cacciatore, Scheufele, & Brossard, 2014). Second, as a common professional norm, 
journalists tend to emphasize dramatic and negative aspects of events and issues to 
elevate their importance in order to draw audience interests (Boykoff, 2007).  
The second most salient climate change attribute in the media agenda was the 
Solution. Perhaps, this is an important aspect of the discourse of climate change in the 
news where proposals are made for policy changes (Liu et al., 2011). At the same time, 
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solutions to climate change mitigation and adaptation also include encouraging social 
acts by individuals (Adger, 2010; Adger, Dessai, Goulden, Hulme, Lorenzoni, Nelson, 
Naess, Wolf, & Wreford, 2009). These social trends have been well reflected in the 
media content regarding climate change (Liu et al., 2011; Nisbet, 2009). 
Existence was the third most frequently mentioned attribute. This finding 
corresponds with previous research on climate change (Carvalho, 2007; Mendelsohn & 
Neumann, 2004; Nisbet, 2009; Smith, 2005), which found a strong link between climate 
change and public discussions of whether or not the phenomenon exists. This also 
indicates that despite the fact that evidence of climate change existence has accumulated 
over the past decades, skepticism of this environmental issue still persists.  
The salience of climate change in the media, perhaps, was driven by many events. 
For example, No-Effects was salient in the media agenda in the first wave because the 
climategate, which occurred in late 2009, raised doubts especially among skeptics about 
the reality of climate change. Similarly 2012 saw a spike in the number of Bad-Effects 
mentioned in the media possibly because of such events as the record-high global 
temperature, the devastation of Hurricane Sandy and several others.   
There are differences in the salience of attributes among partisan media. As found 
in this study, Fox News consistently adopted climate change dismissive attributes (e.g. 
No-Effects, No-Solution, No-Existence, No-Society). In contrast, accepting attributes 
(e.g. Bad-Effects, Solution, Existence) are more salient in the content from other news 
publications (e.g. MSNBC, The New York Times and USA Today). This finding confirms 
the hypothesis that ideologies play an important role in how climate change is portrayed 
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in the media. It also is important to note that the salience of climate change attributes in 
the media was greatly influenced by events that are associated with this issue. For 
example, in 2009, the climategate incidence and the Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen were the two major drivers of the news coverage of the issue. Accordingly, 
four dismissive attributes (i.e. No-Effects, No-Existence and No-Solution) were 
mentioned frequently in the media. Similarly, droughts across the country, heat waves 
and the costly and destructive Hurricane Sandy were possible reasons for the emphasis of 
the news media coverage on the bad effects of climate change and its link with disasters.  
The divergence in the media agenda with regards to climate change has some 
theoretical implications. It is, perhaps, evident that the homogeneity of the media agenda 
may not hold any more. From an agenda-setting perspective, the media do not transmit a 
single agenda of climate change. This argument may be applicable only to the attribute 
agenda and regarding an issue that sees the divide along ideological and political 
partisanship. In revisiting the agenda-setting concept, this finding, in line with others 
(Stroud, 2011), confirms the argument that in today’s media environment, when 
examining agenda-setting effects on such a controversial issue as climate change, it is 
necessary to take into account the stance of particular media outlets.  
This study also went a further step to identify whether the media fragmentation 
and the polarization among the public in terms of climate change have any moderating 
influences on agenda-setting effects through the lens of the compelling arguments 
concept. It found that the differences in the media climate change attribute agenda that 
are found along ideological lines have different effects on respective ideological public 
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groups. Liberals are more likely to be positively influenced by the mentioning of the 
negative consequences of climate change. Conservatives, however, are more susceptible 
to climate change-accepting attributes mentioned in the conservative media, but in the 
negative direction. This seems like a discrepancy because it was expected that 
conservatives’ perception of climate change should be congruent with how the issue is 
portrayed in conservative media. However, past research also pointed out that generally 
conservative audiences are more likely to distrust media and to hold liberal media bias 
perception than their liberal fellows (Lee, 2005). Possibly because of this, effects of the 
media on this group of public with regards to an issue they hold strong opinion about 
actually have a reverse direction.  
In general, findings of this research show stronger agenda-setting effects on 
partisan publics than on independents, which is different from the original agenda-setting 
research. However, from the selective exposure perspective, the notion that, differences 
in media agenda lead to differences in public agenda, and that partisan media can set the 
agenda for their respective audiences (Stroud, 2011).  
One of the goals of this study is to identify compelling arguments effects on the 
public’s intention to engage in actions with regards to climate change. It found that two 
issue image variables Bad-Effects and No-Effects exerted influence on the public’s 
behavioral intention. According to the literature in climate change communication fear-
inducing messages do not motivate personal engagement in or even act to trigger barriers 
to fighting against this environmental problem (O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). 
However, findings of this study show the opposite: In general, the representations of 
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negative consequences of climate change increase audiences’ behavioral intention to act 
against this environmental phenomenon. This study also finds that stating that climate 
change has no effects discourages people’s intention to engage with the issue. These 
findings demonstrate that, perhaps, issue image attributes should be employed to 
encourage the public to participate in actions against climate change. 
This study found moderating effects of belief certainty in the existence of climate 
change on the relationship between the media attribute agenda and the public’s perceived 
importance of climate change as well as its behavioral intention. Those with higher belief 
certainty are more likely to be influenced by the Bad-Effects attributes to perceive 
climate change as an important issue as well as to engage in climate change activism than 
those who do not believe climate change is real. No compelling argument effects were 
found on those who have lower belief certainty in the existence of this environmental 
phenomenon. These findings are in line with past research (Corbett & Dufree, 2004; 
Fortner, Lee, Corney, Romanello, Bonnell, Luthy, Figuerido, & Ntsiko, 2000; Lorenzoni, 
Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007). Theoretically, this indicates that individual 
predispositions do influence attribute agenda-setting effects.   
Reporters as the source had the strongest influence in terms of number of 
significant associations, followed by politicians and scientists. However, a closer look 
reveals that a number of attributes mentioned by reporters and scientists have statistically 
significant positive associations with public opinion and behaviors regarding climate 
change. Those that were mentioned by politicians saw only negative relationships. Not all 
news sources exert equal effects on compelling arguments relationships, confirming the 
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influence of certain news sources on the agenda-setting relationships between the media 
and the public (Son & Weaver, 2006). Possible explanations include the general belief 
that reporters and scientists are more objective than politicians whose words are believed 
to serve the purpose of their own political agenda.  
Methodologically, if a more rigid and conservative approach in data analysis was 
used, only very few (4) associations between two climate change attributes in the liberal 
and all media agendas and liberal publics would remain statistically significant. These 
attributes were Bad-Effects. This implies that liberal publics are more likely to be 
influenced by respective or overall media agendas than other public groups. Positive 
agenda-setting effects of the Bad-Effects attribute were also found among those who are 
more certain about the existence of climate change, while negative impacts were detected 
among those who are less certain about the phenomenon. In short, media’s emphasis on 
negative consequences of climate change still shows a strong influence on particular 
public groups.  
Admittedly, out of 12 attributes only Bad-Effects showed consistent and strong 
effects on public perception and behavioral intention. There were several possible 
explanations. First, despite the fact that it is an unobtrusive issue the public would usually 
has to rely on the media to learn about (McCombs, 2014). However, coverage of climate 
change in the news media has still been limited. This has also caused public apathy 
towards this issue. Second, the use of Pearson’s correlation tests did not allow for more 
powerful statistical analyses, which might reveal more accurate results about the 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables.     
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Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Research 
This study investigates the compelling argument effects of media climate change 
attributes on public opinion and intention to participate in activism. It contributes to the 
literature of agenda setting through exploring the intersection of the compelling argument 
effects and political polarization premises. Specifically, it takes into account individual 
ideological differences among partisan public groups, and demonstrating the moderating 
effects of these differences on agenda-setting effects. 
Studying agenda-setting effects is not new. But examining these effects 
concerning an unobtrusive issue like climate change is not at all common. An extensive 
search of the literature indicated very few studies have applied the theory to climate 
change (Brulle et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2014). None has investigated the compelling 
arguments concept so far. This study is likely the first that has delved into this area. The 
implementation of this project therefore provides a testimony to the application of this 
widely used theoretical framework in today media environment and on such a highly 
controversial issue as climate change. 
Findings of this study confirm some compelling arguments effects between the 
media and the public. It addresses an important question that has been raised for some 
time: In today’s ideologically fragmented media, is the media content on a highly 
controversial issue like climate change still homogeneous? Findings demonstrate that the 
homogeneity of the media attribute agenda particularly with regards to climate change is 
no longer present. Instead, how climate change is portrayed depends on the media 
organization’s ideology. That ideological fragmentation has consequential implications. 
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Evidence from this research shows compelling arguments effects are different for 
different ideological public groups. In addition, this study also found that public 
predispositions such as belief in climate change could influence the compelling 
arguments effects of the media on the public.  
This study contributes to agenda-setting research through suggesting a unique 
approach in exploring compelling argument effects. That is, it extends the compelling 
arguments concept by assessing the influence of media attribute salience on public issue 
salience and actions. Previous research has often been limited to investigating only 
attitudinal and cognitive consequences of compelling argument effects. This study, 
however, has shed a new light on the application of this concept through providing 
empirical evidence of compelling argument effects, confirming that the salience of 
attribute agenda setting does not only influence public salience of an issue object but also 
behavioral intention towards that issue.  
This study is not without limitations. First, in terms of survey data, the use of 
secondary data led to several problems during the implementation of this research 
project. For example, the absence of a media use variable made it impossible to properly 
measure respondents’ media exposure. Without that variable, I was not able to utilize 
more powerful and sophisticated statistical analyses, which looks at predictive rather than 
correlational relationships. In addition, such an absence did not allow for using individual 
articles (independent variables) and individual respondents as units of analysis. 
Furthermore, having no media use variable also affected the way this research applied the 
selective exposure theory. I was not able to identify whether the respondents used the 
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type of media that are in line with their ideologies, thus providing more accurate evidence 
of the intersection between agenda setting and selective exposure. The use of cross-
sectional data in this study might have weakened its statistical analyses. 
Second, this study could have included more news sources such as online news 
sites for media content data. Third, I could have examined affective attributes in 
combination with substantive attributes, especially when coding for media content on a 
highly contentious issue like climate change. The inclusion of affective attributes would 
permit a more thorough examination of how the news media portray the climate change 
controversy. 
Weaknesses of this study, however, suggest possible directions for future research 
in this area. Proper measurement of the public’s media use will help single out which 
type of media that the public has been exposed to, hence allow for more accurate 
identification of effects from the content of that type of media. In addition, using panel 
data may provide more accurate results of longitudinal media effects. Future studies 
should also examine substantive attributes in combination with affective attributes to see 
how such a combination influences public perception of, opinion about, and behaviors 
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